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A HERCULEAN LEAP FOR THE HARD CASE OF 
POST-ACQUISITION CLAIMS: INTERPRETING 
FAIR HOUSING ACT SECTION 3604(b) AFTER 
MODESTO 
Mary Pennisi* 
The hard truth on the matter is 
that American courts have no 
intelligible, generally accepted, 
and consistently applied theory 
of statutory interpretation.1 
 
Housing was the last plank in 
the civil rights revolution, and 
it is the realm in which we 
have experienced the fewest  
integration gains.2 
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INTRODUCTION 
Lynne Bloch and her family peacefully occupied their Chicago condo-
minium for over thirty years.3  Lynne even served on the condominium’s 
association board.4  As observant Jews, the Blochs kept a mezuzah affixed 
 
 3. Bloch v. Frischholz, 533 F.3d 562, 567 (7th Cir. 2008) (Wood, J., dissenting), aff’d 
in part and rev’d in part en banc, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 4. Id. 
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to their doorframe facing the hallway as required by the Jewish faith.5  A 
mezuzah is a small parchment inscribed with Torah verses and encased in a 
carved box that is typically a few inches long and one inch wide.6  Its size 
is comparable to that of a cigarette lighter or roll of Lifesavers candy.  In 
September 2001, the board passed the “Hallway Rule,” prohibiting resi-
dents from placing “[m]ats, boots, shoes, carts or objects of any sort” out-
side their doors.7  Lynne did not foresee that the rule would impact her 
family’s mezuzah.8  However, in 2004, while repainting the hallways, the 
association removed all mezuzot and other religious symbols.9  When 
Lynne affixed another mezuzah, the association once again removed it over 
her objections.10  The removals continued even during the funeral of 
Lynne’s husband, despite her request that the association allow her to dis-
play the mezuzah during the weeklong shiva.11  Upon returning from her 
husband’s burial with the family’s rabbi, she found the mezuzah removed 
and felt humiliated while explaining its absence to him.12  When she sued 
under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), the Seventh Circuit found that the 
Blochs could not raise a claim for post-acquisition discrimination under § 
3604(b).13  Judge Frank Easterbrook wrote, “[o]ur job is not to make the 
law the best it can be, but to enforce the law actually enacted.”14 
Housing discrimination remains pervasive during the post-acquisition 
phase, i.e., after homeowners or renters take possession of their dwellings, 
particularly in urban areas.15  A split in federal circuit courts has left pro-
tection against housing discrimination for dwellers such as the Blochs un-
der FHA § 3604(b) in a state of uncertainty.  The FHA prohibits housing 
providers, e.g., landlords, homeowners, real estate companies, municipali-
ties, and insurance companies, from discriminatorily making housing un-
available to members of certain groups based on their race, religion, sex, 
national origin, familial status, or disability.16  Section 3604(b) specifically 
prohibits “discriminat[ion] against any person in the terms, conditions, or 
 
 5. See id. at 564; see also Deuteronomy 6:4-21 (explaining the religious obligation). 
 6. See Mark A. Berman, Kosher Fraud Statutes and the Establishment Clause: Are 
They Kosher?, 26 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 67 n.340 (1992) (describing mezuzot and 
related consumer protection statutes). 
 7. Bloch, 533 F.3d at 563, 567. 
 8. Id. at 563. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 567. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 567-68. 
 13. Id. at 565-66. 
 14. Id. at 565. 
 15. See infra notes 438-42 and accompanying text. 
 16. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006). 
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privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or 
facilities in connection therewith” because of a protected characteristic.17 
On October 8, 2009, Committee Concerning Community Improvement v. 
City of Modesto18 created a split in federal circuit courts over whether FHA 
§ 3604(b) applies to discrimination that occupants suffer after acquiring 
their dwellings.  The Ninth Circuit19 and many district courts20 have held 
that § 3604(b) applies to post-acquisition events.  By contrast, the Fifth 
Circuit21 and Seventh Circuit22 narrowly interpret the FHA to limit § 
3604(b) to claims involving discrimination that occurs during the pre-
acquisition phase or that amounts to constructive eviction.  The Seventh 
Circuit’s recent decision to rehear the Blochs’ case en banc after Modesto 
reflects the exceptional importance and timeliness of this circuit split in 
civil rights jurisprudence.23  The Seventh Circuit’s painstaking effort to re-
fashion the Blochs’ post-acquisition claim into a pre-acquisition claim also 
demonstrates the arbitrariness of these temporal distinctions and reveals 
how the statute is fundamentally ambiguous. 
This Note examines the split in federal circuit courts created by Modes-
to.  Part I examines the history of the FHA and theories of statutory inter-
pretation.  Part II discusses the split in federal authority and both sides’ in-
terpretative methodologies and rationales.  It demonstrates how the circuits 
subscribe to the same intent-based and meaning-based theories of statutory 
interpretation, yet arrive at different conclusions.  Part III.A maintains that 
meaning-based and intent-based theories are unavailing because the disa-
greement between the circuits arises from a fundamental ambiguity in the 
statute regarding what constitutes housing access, integration, and the “pri-
 
 17. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). 
 18. 583 F.3d 690 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 19. Id. at 713. 
 20. See Richards v. Bono, No. 5:04CV484-OC-10GRJ, 2005 WL 1065141, at *3-4 
(M.D. Fla. May 2, 2005) (differentiating the rental context, where the discrimination can be 
ongoing, from the sale context, where the buyer and seller relationship quickly concludes); 
United States v. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970, 977 (D. Neb. 2004) (finding that tenant’s post-
acquisition sexual harassment claims under § 3604 were cognizable under the FHA); Lan-
desman v. Keys Condo. Owners Ass’n, No. C 04-2685 PJH, 2004 WL 2370638, at *2 (N.D. 
Cal. Oct. 19, 2004) (permitting a claim against condominium association facilities rules al-
leging discrimination against families with children). 
 21. See Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 745 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that the city’s 
allegedly racially discriminatory failure to prevent illegal dumping in a predominantly Afri-
can American neighborhood was not a cognizable claim under § 3604(b) of the FHA be-
cause the service was “not connected to the sale or rental of a dwelling”). 
 22. Bloch v. Frischholz, 533 F.3d 562, 563-64 (7th Cir. 2008), aff’d in part and rev’d in 
part en banc, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009); see also Halprin v. Prairie Single Family 
Homes, 388 F.3d 327, 329 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 23. See Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 771 (7th Cir. 2009). 
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vileges of sale or rental.”  Because traditional interpretive theories fail to 
resolve this ambiguity, Part III.B offers a solution based on an alternative 
interpretative theory, the Coherence Theory, developed by Ronald Dwor-
kin.24  The Coherence Theory posits that Modesto presents a Dworkinian 
tie because housing “access” can be conceptualized as either achieving ge-
nuine ongoing integration and discrimination-free housing or enabling pro-
tected classes to merely take and maintain physical possession of dwel-
lings.  This Note suggests that the Supreme Court should resolve the split 
in authority by interpreting the FHA to advance the “policies or principles 
that furnish the best political justification for the statute” as maintained by 
Dworkin.25  It analyzes the related principles and policy issues concerning 
housing discrimination underlying the FHA and posits that the Supreme 
Court should recognize that the distinction between pre- and post-
acquisition discrimination is arbitrary because housing availability, access, 
and integration involve ongoing rights that do not end at the point of acqui-
sition.  This Note concludes that the Supreme Court should abolish the dis-
tinction between pre- and post-acquisition discrimination by adopting the 
Ninth Circuit’s interpretation and by allowing occupants such as the Blochs 
to seek redress under § 3604(b) for discriminatory treatment that occurs af-
ter acquiring their dwelling not amounting to constructive eviction. 
I.  BACKGROUND OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT 
Part I explains the FHA and its history.  It also reviews methods of in-
terpretation that courts use to resolve close questions of statutory law. 
A. History of the FHA 
This section discusses the substantive provisions and enforcement me-
chanism of the FHA along with its legislative and social history.  Congress 
enacted the FHA as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.26  The FHA 
states that it “is the policy of the United States to provide, within constitu-
tional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States.”27  It pro-
tects particularly vulnerable groups against discrimination in housing.28 
 
 24. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 325-29 (1985) [hereinafter MATTER OF 
PRINCIPLE] (applying Coherence Theory to a hard case of statutory interpretation). 
 25. See id. at 327. 
 26. See Fair Hous. Council of Orange Cnty., Inc. v. Ayres, 855 F. Supp. 315, 316 (C.D. 
Cal. 1994). 
 27. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006). 
 28. See Karen Wong, Narrowing the Definition of “Dwelling” Under the Fair Housing 
Act, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1867, 1867 (2009). 
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1. The Statute 
Sections 3604, 3605,29 and 360630 of the FHA enumerate substantive 
rights and protections enforced under § 3617.31 Sections 3604(a)-(c) and 
3617 prominently figure into the debate over post-acquisition claims. 
Section 3604(a) protects particular classes of individuals against discri-
minatory refusals, which hinder them from acquiring a dwelling in the first 
instance by making it unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent . . . or otherwise 
make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, 
religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.”32  The phrase “otherwise 
make unavailable” covers discriminatory acts that hinder individuals from 
obtaining housing through such means as racial steering,33 discriminatory 
zoning,34 discriminatory provisions of municipal services,35 and mortgage 
or insurance redlining.36  Section 3604(a) also protects dwellers against 
discriminatory acts that cause them to abandon or lose their dwellings, such 
as constructive eviction.37 
 
 29. 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination in residential real estate trans-
actions). 
 30. 42 U.S.C. § 3606 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination in real estate brokerage servic-
es). 
 31. 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2006); see also Rigel C. Oliveri, Is Acquisition Everything? Pro-
tecting the Rights of Occupants Under the Fair Housing Act, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 
11-12 (2008). 
 32. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2006). 
 33. See, e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373 (1982); Casa Marie, 
Inc. v. Super. Ct. of P.R., 988 F.2d 252, 257 n.6 (1st Cir. 1993); City of Chicago v. Mat-
chmaker Real Estate Sales Ctr., Inc., 982 F.2d 1086, 1096 (7th Cir. 1992); Vill. of Bellwood 
v. Dwayne Realty, 482 F. Supp. 1321, 1330 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Wheatley Heights Neighbor-
hood Coal. v. Jenna Resales Co., 429 F. Supp. 486, 488 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Heights Cmty. 
Cong. v. Rosenblatt Realty, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 1, 3 (N.D. Ohio 1975). 
 34. See, e.g., United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1219 (2d Cir. 
1987); Otero v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1133 (2d Cir. 1973) (“An authority 
may not . . . select sites for projects which will be occupied by non-whites only in areas al-
ready heavily concentrated with a high proportion of non-whites.”); Shannon v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Hous. & Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809, 811-12 (3d Cir. 1970). 
 35. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(d)(4) (2010). 
 36. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351, 1357 (6th Cir. 1995) 
(addressing insurance redlining); NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 298-
99, 301 (7th Cir. 1992) (addressing insurance redlining); Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan 
Co., 408 F. Supp. 489, 493 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (addressing mortgage redlining). 
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (“[I]t shall be unlawful . . . [to] make unavailable or deny[] a 
dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national ori-
gin.”); see also, e.g., Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 745-46 (5th Cir. 2005); Harris v. 
Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding discrimination where a landlord false-
ly claimed not to receive a black tenant’s rent check and gave her notice to vacate); Betsey 
v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 988 (4th Cir. 1984) (noting that owners’ attempt to 
evict families with children had a disparate impact on minority tenants); Whisby-Myers v. 
Kiekenapp, 293 F. Supp. 2d 845, 851 (N.D. Ill. 2003); Byrd v. Brandeburg, 922 F. Supp. 60, 
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Section 3604(b) prohibits “discriminat[ion] against any person in the 
terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the pro-
vision of services or facilities in connection therewith” because of a pro-
tected characteristic.38  The section applies to: (i) proposed terms of sale or 
rental;39 (ii) services or facilities related to the initial sale or rental transac-
tion;40 (iii) terms and conditions of housing after rental or sale, including 
discriminatorily subjecting a specific tenant to different rules or fines, im-
posing higher fines, increasing rent,41 or adopting similar generally discri-
minatory rules;42 (iv) maintenance or services connected to a dwelling, es-
pecially delaying repairs;43 (v) privileges of using a dwelling;44 (vi) 
 
64 (N.D. Ohio 1996); Woods v. Foster, 884 F. Supp. 1169, 1174-75 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Stack-
house v. DeSitter, 620 F. Supp. 208, 211 n.6 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (finding that a racial-based 
firebombing intended to evict plaintiffs would violate § 3604(a)). 
 38. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). 
 39. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(b)(1) (2010); see also, e.g., Gorski v. Troy, 929 F.2d 1183, 
1189 (7th Cir. 1991) (striking down a lease which barred children without owners’ written 
consent); ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION 14-4 
(2005).  The statute also applies to contractual terms that are facially neutral but have a dis-
parate impact. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(a) (2010) (proscribing the “discourage[ment] or 
obstruct[ion] [of] choices in a community, neighborhood or development”); see also McDo-
nald v. Verble, 622 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir. 1980) (upholding a victim of discrimination’s claim 
of racial steering although the victim was ultimately permitted to purchase the home); Unit-
ed States v. Pelzer Realty Co., 484 F.2d 438, 445 (5th Cir. 1973) (finding an FHA violation 
where the terms of sale differed between blacks and whites); Brown v. Lo Duca, 307 F. 
Supp. 102, 106 (E.D. Wis. 1969) (granting injunction where a landlord charged black te-
nants higher rent than white tenants). 
 40. See, e.g., NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 302 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(finding FHA to be applicable where lending institutions refused to offer insurance coverage 
in minority areas); Vill. of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1529 (7th Cir. 1990) (find-
ing discrimination where a real estate agent withheld information about listings to black 
home-seekers while informing white home-seekers); SCHWEMM, supra note 39, at 14-17. 
 41. See, e.g., United States v. Sea Winds of Marco, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1051, 1055 (M.D. 
Fla. 1995). 
 42. See, e.g., Woods-Drake v. Lundy, 667 F.2d 1198, 1201 (5th Cir. 1982); Bills v. 
Hodges, 628 F.2d 844, 845 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. L & H Land Corp., 407 F. 
Supp. 576, 580 (S.D. Fla. 1976). 
 43. 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(b) (“Prohibited actions . . . include . . . [f]ailing or delaying 
maintenance or repairs . . . .”).  Many courts have upheld claims against landlords who de-
prive tenants of services based on a protected characteristic. See, e.g., Marbly v. Home 
Props. of N.Y., 205 F. Supp. 2d 736, 743 (E.D. Mich. 2002).  Courts have also allowed te-
nants to sue landlords for providing substandard services to an entire dwelling based on its 
tenants’ shared protected characteristics. See, e.g., Durrett v. Hous. Auth., 896 F.2d 600, 
601, 605 (1st Cir. 1990); Concerned Tenants Ass’n of Indian Trails Apts. v. Indian Trails 
Apts., 496 F. Supp. 522, 525-26 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (permitting FHA claim to proceed where 
management stopped servicing the dwelling when its occupants became predominantly 
black). 
 44. 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(b)(4).  Landlords cannot discriminatorily exclude tenants from 
an amenity or common area. See, e.g., Schroeder v. De Bertolo, 879 F. Supp. 173, 175 (D. 
P.R. 1995) (noting that a disabled woman was excluded from common areas). 
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harassment;45 and (vii) provision of municipal services.46  Post-acquisition 
claims under § 3604(b) most often involve discrimination in the terms and 
conditions of housing after rental or sale, such as maintenance, privileges, 
harassment, and municipal services.47  In the conflicting federal cases, vic-
 
 45. This application evolved from Title VII jurisprudence, which prohibits employers 
from “discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).  Title VII’s 
“terms and conditions” provision is similar to the terms and conditions language of § 
3604(b) and led courts to apply § 3604(b) to housing harassment claims similar to both quid 
pro quo and hostile environment theories. See United States v. Veal, 365 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 
1036 (W.D. Mo. 2004); see also Krueger v. Cuomo, 115 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 1997); Be-
liveau v. Caras, 873 F. Supp. 1393, 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1995); Grieger v. Sheets, 689 F. Supp. 
835, 840-41 (N.D. Ill. 1988); New York ex rel. Abrams v. Merlino, 694 F. Supp. 1101, 1104 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
 46. Courts have applied § 3604(b) to situations where a municipality provides substan-
dard services to areas dominated by occupants from a protected class. See, e.g., United 
Farmworkers of Fla. v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799, 808 (5th Cir. 1974) (dealing 
with sewage treatment); see also, e.g., Franks v. Ross, 313 F.3d 184, 191 (4th Cir. 2002); 
McCauley v. City of Jacksonville, No. 86-1674, 1987 WL 44775, at *2 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 
1987); Southend Neighborhood Improvement Ass’n v. Cnty. of St. Clair, 743 F.2d 1207, 
1210 (7th Cir. 1984) (“That subsection [(b)] applies to services generally provided by go-
vernmental units such as police and fire protection or garbage collection . . . .”); Lopez v. 
City of Dallas, No. 3:03-CV-2223-M, 2004 WL 2026804, at *6-9 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2004); 
Middlebrook v. City of Bartlett, 341 F. Supp. 2d 950, 960-61 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) (dealing 
with discrimination in water services); Miller v. City of Dallas, No. 3:98-CV-2955-D, 2002 
WL 230834, at *14 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2002) (dealing with flood protection, zoning, land-
fill practices, street drainage, and federal funding); Campbell v. City of Berwyn, 815 F. 
Supp. 1138, 1143-44 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (addressing discrimination in the provision of police 
protection).  However, because the FHA is not a “civil rights statute of general applicabili-
ty,” but instead “deal[s] with the specific problems of fair housing opportunities,” some 
courts have only recognized claims involving “traditional” municipal services directly re-
lated to housing. Jersey Heights Neighborhood Ass’n v. Glendening, 174 F.3d 180, 193 (4th 
Cir. 1999) (citing Vercher v. Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 454 F. Supp. 423, 424 (M.D. Pa. 
1978)); S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 254 F. Supp. 2d 486, 
502-03 (D. N.J. 2003) (holding that industrial air pollution permits do not constitute “servic-
es”); Laramore v. Ill. Sports Facilities Auth., 722 F. Supp. 443, 452 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (noting 
that § 3604(b) does not cover municipal zoning decisions). 
 47. See, e.g., Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 
690 (9th Cir. 2009) (alleged discrimination concerning provision of municipal services to 
predominantly Hispanic communities, including sewage treatment and law enforcement); 
Bloch v. Frischholz, 533 F.3d 562, 563-64 (7th Cir. 2008) (prohibiting residents from affix-
ing objects, including religious symbols, to doorways), aff’d in part and rev’d in part en 
banc, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009); Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 749 (5th Cir. 2005) 
(dismissing complaints of illegal dumping in a predominantly black neighborhood); Ri-
chards v. Bono, No. 5:04-CV484-OC-10GRJ, 2005 WL 1065141, at *3-4 (M.D. Fla. May 2, 
2009) (claiming male landlord sexually harassed female tenant and made quid pro quo sex-
ual demands); Landesman v. Keys Condo. Owners Ass’n, No. C 04-2685 PJH, 2004 WL 
2370638, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2004) (alleging discrimination against families with 
children for restricting minors’ access to common areas and amenities); United States v. 
Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970, 973 (D. Neb. 2004) (claiming male landlord sexually harassed 
female tenants). 
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tims typically allege violations that arise during the post-acquisition phase 
when a housing provider, such as a landlord or condominium board, inter-
feres with a dwelling or withholds services from the tenant or owner.48 
Section 3604(c) prohibits “mak[ing], print[ing], or publish[ing], or 
caus[ing] to be made, printed, or published [any] . . . notice, statement, or 
advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates 
any preference, limitation, or discrimination” based on a protected catego-
ry, “or . . . inten[ding] to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimi-
nation.”49  Courts typically apply § 3604(c) to pre-acquisition violations 
where the housing provider discriminatorily advertises the dwelling or ne-
gotiates with prospective dwellers.50  Some courts have upheld § 3604(c) 
claims concerning post-acquisition discrimination, such as where a landlord 
makes discriminatory statements to current tenants51 or presents an eviction 
notice containing discriminatory language.52 
Section 3617 provides an enforcement mechanism for § 3604 by making 
it unlawful “to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in 
the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or en-
joyed, or on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in 
the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by” the subs-
tantive rights.53  The phrase “exercise and enjoyment” protects a dweller’s 
ability to exercise her substantive rights by filing a HUD complaint without 
facing retaliatory eviction,54 assist another person in enjoying her substan-
tive rights by helping the third party file a HUD complaint without facing 
retaliatory eviction,55 and acquire or reside in a dwelling free from discrim-
ination, even if the dweller elects not to invoke or exercise her § 3604 
rights.56  Therefore, a housing provider violates § 3617 if she interferes 
with a dweller’s enjoyment of her § 3604 rights or retaliates against a dwel-
ler because the dweller either directly exercised her § 3604 substantive 
 
 48. See supra note 37. 
 49. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2006). 
 50. See, e.g., United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 210 (4th Cir. 1972) (alleging lan-
dlord advertised rental property as available to white tenants only); see also, e.g., United 
States v. Lorantffy Care Ctr., 999 F. Supp. 1037, 1041 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (noting defen-
dant’s statement that she refused to rent to black dwellers). 
 51. See, e.g., Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying § 3604(c) 
to a landlord’s agent who made racist statements to a white tenant overheard by a black te-
nant). 
 52. See, e.g., HUD v. Denton, Fair Hous.—Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen) ¶ 25,014 (HUD 
ALJ 1991) (concerning a discriminatory statement appended to an eviction). 
 53. 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2006). 
 54. See Krueger v. Cuomo, 115 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 55. See Meadows v. Edgewood Mgmt. Corp., 432 F. Supp. 334, 335 (W.D. Va. 1977). 
 56. See Oliveri, supra note 31. 
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rights or helped a third party exercise her § 3604 rights.57  Section 3617 
contains no explicit temporal element and does not link the violative con-
duct it specifies with the “sale or rental of housing.”58  Some have sug-
gested that this section may furnish a source for post-acquisition claims 
where a housing provider interferes with a dweller’s enjoyment of her 
housing.59  However, many courts have held that a plaintiff must prove that 
her housing provider has violated a substantive right granted by the other 
provisions of the FHA to establish a § 3617 claim.60  These courts do not 
permit victims to allege independent violations of § 3617.61 
2. Legislative History 
Congress passed the FHA amid an avalanche of nationwide riots and the 
social outcry that followed Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s assassination.62  
Throughout the late 1960s, Congress confronted racial tensions on a daily 
basis as violence ran rampant blocks away from the Capitol.63  In response 
to this social upheaval, a presidential commission called upon Congress to 
enact fair housing legislation in 1966.64  As Congress scrutinized various 
drafts of bills, segregation abounded in residential housing and severely li-
mited African Americans’ abilities to access and integrate into quality 
dwellings.65  The FHA’s advocates sought to overturn housing segregation 
by eliminating pervasive discrimination and promoting integration.66 
 
 57. See 42 U.S.C. § 3617. 
 58. See Gourlay v. Forest Lakes Civic Ass’n, 276 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1235 (M.D. Fla. 
2003) (“Section 3617 regulates discriminatory conduct before, during, or after a sale or ren-
tal of a dwelling.”). 
 59. See Oliveri, supra note 31. 
 60. See, e.g., Frazier v. Rominger, 27 F.3d 828, 834 (2d Cir. 1994); Reule v. Sherwood 
Valley I Council of Co-Owners, Inc., No. Civ.A. H-05-3197, 2005 WL 2669480, at *4 (S.D. 
Tex. Oct. 19, 2005). 
 61. Frazier, 27 F.3d at 834; Reule, 2005 WL 2669480, at *4. 
 62. See Robert G. Schwemm, Cox, Halprin, and Discriminatory Municipal Services 
Under the Fair Housing Act, 41 IND. L. REV. 717, 757 (2008). 
 63. See Oliveri, supra note 31, at 27. 
 64. PRESIDENT’S NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 473 (1968). 
 65. See id. at 259-60; see also DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN 
APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 26-59 (1993). 
 66. See Richard Sander, Comment, Individual Rights and Demographic Realities: The 
Problem of Fair Housing, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 874, 902, 920 (1988) (citing J. McGrew, HUD 
Memorandum to L. Simons (1981)) (“Congress anticipated that the abolition of racially dis-
criminatory housing practices would ultimately result in residential integration.”). 
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The FHA’s legislative history is scant compared to the voluminous 
records that accompany other civil rights-era legislation.67  It primarily in-
cludes floor debates and committee hearings on three prior versions of the 
bill.68  Hearings that evaluated prior drafts of the FHA focused on Con-
gress’ general imperative to lead African Americans out of urban ghettos 
and achieve equality through fair housing legislation rather than scrutiniz-
ing § 3604’s substantive provisions.69  Floor debates also did not discuss § 
3604’s substantive language, but instead clarified the FHA’s exemptions70 
and identified the proper defendants.71  Hearing and floor debates are there-
fore silent on the rationale behind the language adopted in § 3604(b).72 
Although Congress considered five variations of the bill, the language of 
§ 3604(b) remained largely unchanged throughout the drafting process.73  
In 1966, the Johnson Administration submitted a proposed draft of the pro-
vision to Congress.74  It prohibited homeowners, real estate brokers, and 
other categories of persons from “discriminat[ing] against any person in the 
terms, conditions, or privileges of sale, rental, or lease of a dwelling, or in 
the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of 
race, color, religion, or national origin.”75  Later, the Senate and House 
evaluated identical bills76 in committee hearings using the same language 
as the Administration’s proposal.77  Subsequently in 1967, Senator Walter 
 
 67. For an example of civil rights-era legislation with voluminous legislative history, see 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979). 
 68. See H.R. 14765, 89th Cong. (1966); S. 3296, 89th Cong. (1966); S. 1358 89th Cong. 
(1966); see also Schwemm, supra note 62. 
 69. See Fair Housing Act of 1967: Hearings on S. 1358, S. 2114, and S. 2280 Before the 
Subcomm. on Hous. and Urban Affairs of the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th 
Cong. 438-59 (1967); Hearings on S. 1026, S. 1318, S. 1359, S. 1362, S. 1462, H.R. 2516 
and H.R. 10805 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 90th Cong. (1967). 
 70. The FHA sets forth a limited exemption for owners whose dwellings contain four or 
fewer units and who reside in one of the units, 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (2000), and for sin-
gle-family homes sold or rented by private individuals who own no more than three such 
homes and who do not use real estate brokers, agents, or salespeople. 42 U.S.C. § 
3603(b)(1). 
 71. See 114 CONG. REC. 4907 (1968). 
 72. See Oliveri, supra note 31, at 25-30; see also NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 
978 F.2d 287, 299 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Silence . . . could imply that the debate was about the 
principle of non-discrimination, leaving details to the future. The backward phraseology of § 
3604 suggests [this] possibility.”). 
 73. See 114 CONG. REC. 9612-13 (1968) (stating that the 1968 Senate-passed version of 
§ 3617 was “comparable” to the 1966 House version, which was identical to the Johnson 
Administration’s initial proposal). 
 74. 112 CONG. REC. 9397 (1966). 
 75. Id. 
 76. S. 3296, 89th Cong. (1966); H.R. 14765, 89th Cong. (1966). 
 77. H.R. 14765; S. 3296; 112 CONG. REC. 9394-98. 
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Mondale submitted another version of the bill78 with similar language that 
omitted the word “lease” from the provision.79  The House passed Senator 
Mondale’s version,80 however, the Senate Judiciary Committee rejected 
it.81  In early 1968, Senators Mondale and Brooke presented a new proposal 
that retained the language of Senator Mondale’s original version of § 
3604(b).82  The proposal amended another civil rights bill83 already under 
the Senate’s consideration.84  Senator Everett Dirksen then sponsored a 
compromise amendment that replaced the Mondale-Brooke proposal.85  
Senator Dirksen changed its enforcement mechanism, but retained Mon-
dale’s and Johnson’s substantive language in section (b).86  The House then 
added the amendment to the civil rights bill87 on the Senate floor.88  How-
ever, when the fair housing title was introduced, no one explained the par-
ticular meaning of its substantive provisions.89 
In 1968, the President’s National Advisory Committee on Civil Disord-
ers released a report on urban riots that accelerated Congress’ progress on 
 
 78. S. 1358, 90th Cong. (1967). 
 79. See Proposed Civil Rights Act of 1967: Hearings on S. 1026, S. 1318, S. 1359, S. 
1362, S. 1462, H.R. 2516, and H.R. 10805 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. (1967). 
 80. S. 1358; see also 112 CONG. REC. INDEX 1183 (1966); 112 CONG. REC. 18,739-40 
(1966) (reporting passage of the bill); Fair Housing Act of 1967: Hearings on S. 1358, S. 
2114, and S. 2280 Before the Subcomm. on Hous. and Urban Affairs of the S. Comm. on 
Banking and Currency, 90th Cong. (1967). 
 81. See 112 CONG. REC. INDEX 1183 (1966). 
 82. See 114 CONG. REC. 4570-73 (1968).  The proposal merely added the “Mrs. Mur-
phy” exemption. Id. at 2270 (§ 4(f)).  It omitted the phrase “oral or written” in § 3604(c), 
which remained identical to the original language used by the Johnson Administration as 
amended by the House Judiciary Committee. See id.  at 4572; see also Robert G. Schwemm, 
Discriminatory Housing Statements and § 3604(c): A New Look at the Fair Housing Act’s 
Most Intriguing Provision, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 187, 204-05 nn.67-73 (2001). 
 83. H.R. 2516, 90th Cong. (2d Sess. 1968). 
 84. See 114 CONG. REC. 2270-72 (proposal printed); id. at 2279 (amendment formally 
offered); see also Robert G. Schwemm, Discriminatory Effect and the Fair Housing Act, 54 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 199, 208 (1978).  The bill prohibited racially motivated violence 
against African Americans and civil rights workers. Id. 
 85. See 114 CONG. REC. 4570-73.  The Dirksen amendment incorporated an enforce-
ment mechanism through HUD. See Jean Eberhart Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative 
History and Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149, 157 (1969). 
 86. See 114 CONG. REC. 4571; see also Dubofsky, supra note 93, at 157.  Senator Dirk-
sen merely placed the substantive provisions at the end of the statute and inserted a conclu-
sion sentence, stating that “[t]his section may be enforced by appropriate civil action.” Id.  
The 1988 Fair Housing Amendments Act made a § 3617 enforceable through the FHA’s 
other enforcement procedures. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(f) (1988). 
 87. H.R. 2516. 
 88. Dubofsky, supra note 85, at 158. 
 89. See 114 CONG. REC. 4907 (1968). 
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the FHA.90  The report emphasized that racial segregation remained perva-
sive in housing and threatened the stability of American society.91  It called 
Congress to thus expedite the fair housing legislation.92  One week later, on 
March 11, 1968, the Senate passed Dirksen’s bill with minor amendments 
and sent it back to the House for approval.93  On April 10, 1968, while riots 
raged outside the Capitol and the nation mourned the death of Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr., whose funeral occurred on the preceding day, the House 
re-considered the bill.94  The Rules Committee allowed the House to debate 
the bill for only one hour without committee consideration or the publica-
tion of formal reports explaining its terms.95  While evaluating the Senate-
approved version, the House Judiciary Committee Chairman Emanuel Cel-
lar compared the bill to the 1966 House-version and noted that the substan-
tive provisions “prohibited almost the exact same type of conduct with re-
spect to housing discrimination.”96  House Republican leader Gerald Ford 
also noted that § 3604(b) was similar to the House-passed version.97  The 
House ultimately voted in favor of the Senate’s version.98 
On April 11, 1968, President Johnson signed the bill and enacted the 
FHA into law.99  Congress thereby incorporated Johnson’s original lan-
guage of the substantive provisions into the final version of § 3604(b).100  
The Mondale-Brooke proposal and Dirksen’s compromise proposal effec-
tively preserved it.101 
Because the language of § 3604(b) underwent little scrutiny over the two 
year drafting process, no legislative records address the subsection’s appli-
cability to post-acquisition claims.  While the original versions limited po-
 
 90. See Dubofsky, supra note 85, at 158-59; see also PRESIDENT’S NATIONAL ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 64, at 263. 
 91. See Dubofsky, supra note 85, at 158-59; see also PRESIDENT’S NATIONAL ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 64, at 263. 
 92. See Dubofsky, supra note 85, at 158-59; see also PRESIDENT’S NATIONAL ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 64, at 263. 
 93. See 114 CONG. REC. 5992 (1968); see also Dubofsky, supra note 85, at 159. 
 94. See Oliveri, supra note 31, at 27. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See 114 CONG. REC. 9560 (1968). 
 97. Id. at 9611-13. 
 98. Id. at 9620-21, 5992. 
 99. See Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks Upon Signing the Civil Rights Act, in PUBLIC PA-
PERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: LYNDON B. JOHNSON: 1968-69, at 509 
(1970). 
 100. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2006); see also 114 CONG. REC. 4570-73. 
 101. The Dirksen proposal’s alteration of the Mondale-Brooke version did not relate to 
the eventual wording of § 3604(a) and § 3604(b). See Schwemm, supra note 82. 
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tential defendants to those renting or selling dwellings,102 Senator Mon-
dale’s 1967 proposal replaced this phrase with a general prohibition stating 
“[i]t shall be unlawful,” which makes the FHA applicable to all persons and 
entities, including municipalities.103  Some suggest that the original ver-
sion’s inclusion of “manager[s]” and those who have “the authority to . . . 
manage” dwellings indicates that the Johnson Administration originally in-
tended the substantive provisions to cover discrimination against residents 
after they acquired their dwellings.104  Nevertheless, because the language 
of the subsections was subject to little change and virtually no discussion, 
the statute’s legislative history provides little guidance to courts interpret-
ing the FHA’s substantive rights.105 
Alternatively, the FHA’s introduction setting forth its overarching policy 
goals underwent significant alteration.  The Johnson Administration’s 1966 
original proposal stated, “[i]t is the policy of the United States to prevent, 
and the right of every person to be protected against, discrimination on ac-
count of race, color, religion, or national origin in the purchase, rental, 
lease, financing, use and occupancy of housing throughout the Nation.”106  
Some have suggested that the phrase “use and occupancy” may indicate 
that the original drafters intended subsections (a) and (b) to apply to current 
dwellers and provide post-acquisition claims.107  Senator Mondale’s 1967 
proposal, however, partially omitted the phrase, stating, “[i]t is the policy 
of the United States to prevent discrimination on account of race, color, re-
ligion, or national origin in the purchase, rental, financing, and occupancy 
of housing throughout the United States.”108  Legislative history sheds no 
light on Mondale’s rationale behind deleting the word “use.”109  Senator 
Dirksen’s version, which later became the FHA, further simplified it with-
 
 102. The Johnson Administration’s proposed bill applied to an “owner, lessee, sublessee, 
assignee, or manager of, or other person having the authority to sell, rent, lease, or manage, 
a dwelling, or for any person who is a real estate broker or salesman, or employee or agent 
of a real estate broker or salesman.” 112 CONG. REC. 9397 (1966).  The House version only 
covered real estate professionals, including a “real estate broker, agent, or salesman, or em-
ployee or agent of any real estate broker, agent, or salesman, or any other person in the 
business of building, developing, selling, renting, or leasing dwellings, or any employee or 
agent of any such person.” Id. at 18,193. 
 103. See Ventura Vill., Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 419 F.3d 725, 727-28 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(listing “[v]arious types of municipal actions [that] have been challenged under the FHA”).  
 104. See, e.g., Schwemm, supra note 62, at 762 n.272. 
 105. Id. 
 106. 112 CONG. REC. 9396 (1966) (emphasis added). 
 107. See Schwemm, supra note 62, at 762 n.272. 
 108. See Proposed Civil Rights Act of 1967: Hearings on S. 1026, S. 1318, S. 1359, S. 
1362, S. 1462, H.R. 2516 and H.R. 10805 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 439-41 (1967). 
 109. See Schwemm, supra note 62, at 762. 
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out explanation to state, “[i]t is the policy of the United States to provide 
for fair housing throughout the United States.”110 
3. Social History 
In the 1960s, racial segregation in housing was rampant throughout the 
United States.111  Racially-motivated threats, intimidation, and harassment 
fueled housing discrimination and the development of urban ghettos.112  
Housing segregation particularly stymied underrepresented groups in their 
efforts to achieve civil rights because the home represents “one of the most 
psychologically significant locations in society . . . .”113  The home signi-
fies a major source of stability, continuity, belonging, and connection to 
social networks.114  One’s sense of home is vital to his or her psychological 
 
 110. 114 CONG. REC. 4571 (1968). 
 111. See Wendell E. Pritchett, Where Shall We Live? Class and the Limitations of Fair 
Housing Law, 35 URB. LAW. 399, 404 (2003); Leonard S. Rubinowitz & Imani Perry, 
Crimes Without Punishment: White Neighbors’ Resistance to Black Entry, 92 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 335, 410-13 (2001). See generally Martin E. Sloane, One Year’s Experience: 
Current and Potential Impact of the Housing Order, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 457, 468 
(1964) (noting that President Kennedy stated that the “objective” of achieving “a decent 
home and a suitable living environment for every American family . . . cannot be fulfilled as 
long as some Americans are denied equal access to . . . housing”). 
 112. See Aric Short, Post-Acquisition Harassment and the Scope of the Fair Housing Act, 
58 ALA. L. REV. 203, 254 (2006); see also JOE R. FEAGIN ET AL., WHITE RACISM 1-50 (2d ed. 
2001) (explaining the impact of racial violence).  Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton 
define a “ghetto” as “a set of neighborhoods that are exclusively inhabited by members of 
one group, within which virtually all members of that group live . . . [which] has been the 
paradigmatic residential configuration [for urban blacks] for at least eighty years.” MASSEY 
& DENTON, supra note 65, at 18-19; see also Otero v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 
1134 (2d Cir. 1973) (noting “Congress’ desire in providing fair housing throughout the 
United States was to stem the spread of urban ghettos and to promote open, integrated hous-
ing”). 
 113. See Short, supra note 112. 
 114. See, e.g., Sandy G. Smith, The Essential Qualities of A Home, 14 J. ENVTL. PSY-
CHOL. 31, 31-33 (1994) (observing that people associate home environments with continui-
ty, privacy, self-expression, social relationships, and warmth); see also, e.g., Roberta M. 
Feldman, Settlement-Identity: Psychological Bonds with Home Places in a Mobile Society, 
22 ENV’T & BEHAV. 183, 186 (1990) (observing how individuals tend to renovate a new 
property when they switch residences so that it will resemble their prior residence); Marga-
ret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959 (1982) (noting how 
people tend to become psychologically attached to homes); Karin Zingmark, Astrid Norberg 
& Per-Olof Sandman, The Experience of Being at Home Throughout the Life Span; Investi-
gation of Persons Aged From 2 to 102, 41 INT’L J. AGING & HUM. DEV. 47, 54 (1995) (not-
ing how individuals associate home with family life).  Today, the metaphor of one’s “home 
as a castle” remains powerful in both cultural perceptions and legal treatment of housing. D. 
Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 276 (2006).  
Congress identified providing every American family with a “decent home” as a national 
objective in 1949. See 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000).  Many areas of law protect one’s right to 
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well-being115 because it strongly relates to one’s concept of privacy, securi-
ty, family, and continuity.116  The significance of home has always been 
greater for minority groups, especially as they struggled for civil rights.117  
“To the extent that members of minority groups feel discriminated against 
or oppressed in their daily lives, home is where they may retreat to receive 
support, comfort, and strength.”118  Therefore, by directly attacking their 
sense of home, segregation and race-based violence that propelled minori-
ties to relocate adversely impacted their psychological well-being.119  In 
identifying housing discrimination as an invidious impediment to minori-
ties’ civil rights, the FHA recognized the unique significance of housing in 
the context of racial discrimination.120 
 
possess his or her house to a greater extent than other types of property. See Barros, supra, 
at 277. 
 115. See Mindy Thompson Fullilove, Psychiatric Implications of Displacement: Contri-
butions from the Psychology of Place, 153 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1516, 1517 (1996) (“[T]he 
sense of belonging . . . is necessary for psychological well-being, [and] depends on strong, 
well-developed relationships with nurturing places . . . . [D]isturbance in these essential 
place relationships leads to psychological disorder.”); see also Marco Simons, The Emer-
gence of a Norm Against Arbitrary Forced Relocation, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 95, 
112-13 (2002). But see Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal My-
thology of Home, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1093, 1110-16 (2009). 
 116. See Barros, supra note 114, at 256-57; see also Kelo v. City of New London, 545 
U.S. 469, 518 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting the importance of the concept of home 
in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence); Frank S. Alexander, The Housing of America’s Fam-
ilies: Control, Exclusion, and Privilege, 54 EMORY L.J. 1231, 1231-32 (2005); Megan J. 
Ballard, Legal Protections for Home Dwellers: Caulking the Cracks to Preserve Occupan-
cy, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 277, 277 (2006) (examining “[t]he sacred status of a home”); John 
Fee, Eminent Domain and the Sanctity of Home, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 783, 786-87 
(2006) (explaining how the Fourth Amendment recognizes the sanctity of the home); Tim 
Iglesias, Our Pluralist Housing Ethics and the Struggle for Affordability, 42 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 511, 511-13 (2007). See generally Avital Margalit, The Value of Home Ownership, 
7 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 467 (2006). 
 117. See Short, supra note 112, at 253-54. 
 118. Id. at 254; see also Deborah Zalesne, The Intersection of Socioeconomic Class and 
Gender in Hostile Housing Environment Claims Under Title VIII: Who is the Reasonable 
Person?, 38 B.C. L. REV. 861, 886-88 (1997).  “[H]ome often represents the only reliable 
anchor available to them in a hostile white-dominated world.” Joe R. Feagin, A House is Not 
a Home: White Racism and U.S. Housing Practices, in RESIDENTIAL APARTHEID: THE AMER-
ICAN LEGACY 17, 20 (Robert D. Bullard et al. eds., 1994). 
 119. See FEAGIN ET AL., supra note 112, at 37-39 (noting that one black individual re-
counted that the cross burnings and racially-motivated violence caused him to feel “perso-
nally violated”). 
 120. See 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1988); see also 114 CONG. REC. 2280 (1968) (statement of 
Sen. Edward W. Brooke) (describing housing discrimination and segregation as “a malady 
so widespread and so deeply imbedded in the national psyche that many Americans, Ne-
groes as well as whites, have come to regard it as a natural condition”). 
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Housing discrimination undermined minorities’ sense of home through-
out the twentieth century.121  Although the urban ghetto has become a ubi-
quitous image associated with cities, segregation was not always so perva-
sive.  In the nineteenth century, northern cities were not as segregated as 
they later became.122  During the early twentieth century, aggressive Jim 
Crow laws in the South and the rise of industrial jobs in the North sparked 
an influx of southern black migrants in northern cities.123  Hostility and re-
sentment against Southern blacks grew among Caucasian workers as indus-
 
 121. See Short, supra note 112, at 253-55. See generally Nicole A. Forkenbrock Lin-
demyer, Sexual Harassment on the Second Shift: The Misfit Application of Title VII Em-
ployment Standards to Title VIII Housing Cases, 18 LAW & INEQ. 351, 371 (2000). 
 122. See Michael B. de Leeuw et. al., The Current State of Residential Segregation and 
Housing Discrimination: The United States’ Obligations Under the International Conven-
tion on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, 13 MICH. J. RACE & L. 337, 
355-56 (“Indeed, before 1900, nothing resembling the modern racially identifiable ghetto 
existed in northern cities.”); see also DARREL E. BIGHAM, WE ASK ONLY A FAIR TRIAL: A 
HISTORY OF THE BLACK COMMUNITY OF EVANSVILLE, INDIANA 26-27 (1987) (explaining that 
Evansville was racially integrated during the late nineteenth century); JAMES A. KUSHNER, 
APARTHEID IN AMERICA: A HISTORICAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF CONTEMPORARY RACIAL 
SEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (1980); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 65, at 20-21, 
26-42; C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 100 (2001) (noting that 
housing segregation was uncommon until the beginning of the twentieth century); Short, 
supra note 112, at 250-51; Henry L. Taylor, Spatial Organization and the Residential Expe-
rience: Black Cincinnati in 1850, 10 SOC. SCI. HIST. 45, 46-49 (1986) (describing neighbor-
hoods during the Civil War as “highly heterogeneous; different populations lived side by 
side in the city”); Joseph Seliga, Comment, Gautreaux a Generation Later: Remedying the 
Second Ghetto or Creating the Third, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1049, 1053 (2000).  Although em-
ployment discrimination caused African Americans to occupy poorer quality housing, they 
lived alongside Caucasians of the same income bracket. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 
65, at 19-20; Taylor, supra, at 63 (“Occupation and socio-economic status functioned as the 
primary determinants of residential location in antebellum Cincinnati.”).  As minorities ob-
tained better jobs, they obtained higher quality housing alongside their white counterparts. 
See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 65, at 19-20.  For instance, housing discrimination in 
Chicago began in 1917 when real estate brokers adopted a policy actively excluding Blacks 
from White neighborhoods. See Leonard S. Rubinowitz & Kathryn Shelton, Non-Violent 
Direct Action and the Legislative Process: The Chicago Freedom Movement and the Feder-
al Fair Housing Act, 41 IND. L. REV. 663, 674-75 (2008). 
 123. See STEPHEN GRANT MEYER, AS LONG AS THEY DON’T MOVE NEXT DOOR: SEGRE-
GATION AND RACIAL CONFLICT IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 32 (2000) (explaining that 
between 1901 and 1930, over 235,000 African-Americans moved to New York, Philadel-
phia’s African-American population more than doubled to 220,000, Detroit’s African-
American population increased ten-fold, and Chicago received more than 200,000 African-
Americans); Willie Brown, The Forgotten Type of Capital: Addressing the Social Capital 
Deficiency in the Inner City, 11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 527, 539-40 (2004); Dash 
T. Douglas, A House Divided: The Social and Economic Underdevelopment of America’s 
Inner Cities, 10 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 369, 371 (1999) (“From 1910 to 1930, approx-
imately 1.25 million African Americans migrated from the South to northern cities in search 
of work [and] . . . formed a northern urban proletariat.”). 
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trial leaders recruited them to work as strikebreakers.124  Racial tensions 
abounded as Northerners perceived blacks to be inferior125 and to pose a 
threat to white workers’ job security.126  Southern blacks were met with an-
tagonism over housing.127  White neighborhoods used violence and racially 
restrictive covenants to exclude them.128  To escape the mounting violence 
 
 124. See KUSHNER, supra note 122, at 559-61; Robert J. Cottrol, Submission is Not the 
Answer: Lethal Violence, Microcultures of Criminal Violence and the Right to Self-Defense, 
69 U. COLO. L. REV. 1029, 1057 n.92 (1998); Deborah Kenn, Paradise Unfound: The Amer-
ican Dream of Housing Justice for All, 5 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 69, 84-85 (1995) (discussing 
“competition for jobs and employers’ use of African-American workers as strikebreakers”); 
Stephen Plass, Dualism And Overlooked Class Consciousness in American Labor Laws, 37 
HOUS. L. REV. 823, 844 n.88 (2000); William Patrick Nicholson, Note, Just Another Day in 
the Neighborhood? The Shaping of a Legal (and Social) Consciousness in Harlem, 64 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 267, 273 n.29 (2009) (citing GILBERT OSOFSKY, HARLEM: THE MAKING OF A 
GHETTO 42 (1966)). 
 125. See WOODWARD, supra note 122, at 18-19; see also MADISON GRANT, THE PASSING 
OF THE GREAT RACE xxvii (1916) (calling intellectuals to “rous[e] fellow Americans to the 
overwhelming importance of race and to the folly of the Melting Pot”); Christopher A. Bra-
cey, Dignity in Race Jurisprudence, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 669, 711 n.195 (2005) (citing 
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927)); Gregory Michael Dorr, Principled Expediency: 
Eugenics, Naim v. Naim, and the Supreme Court, 42 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119, 124 (1998) 
(discussing racial purity theories of American eugenicists); Rachel D. Godsil, Viewing the 
Cathedral From Behind the Color Line: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Environmental 
Racism, 53 EMORY L.J. 1807, 1839-40 (2004); Herbert Hovenkamp, Social Science and Se-
gregation Before Brown, 1985 DUKE L.J. 624, 651-57 (1985) (examining racial inferiority 
theories that abounded during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries); Bernie D. Jones, 
Southern Free Women of Color in the Antebellum North: Race, Class, and a “New Women’s 
Legal History,” 41 AKRON L. REV. 763, 765 (2008); Leonard S. Rubinowitz & Ismail Al-
sheik, A Missing Piece: Fair Housing and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 48 HOW. L.J. 841, 870 
(2005) (noting the “prevailing view of the day that Blacks were socially inferior”). 
 126. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 65, at 28-29; Godsil, supra note 125, at 1839 
(“[W]orking class whites, many of whom were recent immigrants, feared the economic 
competition from Blacks . . . .”); Michael J. Klarman, Race and the Court in the Progressive 
Era, 51 VAND. L. REV. 881, 910 (1998). See generally CHARLES CARROLL, THE NEGRO A 
BEAST (1900). 
 127. See ALLEN BALLARD, ONE MORE DAY’S JOURNEY: THE STORY OF A FAMILY AND A 
PEOPLE 157 (1984); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 65, at 30; see also Douglas, supra note 
123, at 371-72 (“[Southern black migrants] were . . . relegated to separate and dilapidated 
urban ghettos.”); Godsil, supra note 125.  Prevailing theories of racial inferiority led whites 
to fear race mixing and spurred support for segregation. See id.; Hovenkamp, supra note 
125, at 656-58 (examining how racial inferiority theories that abounded promoted segrega-
tion). See generally Paul A. Lombardo, “The American Breed”: Nazi Eugenics and the Ori-
gins of the Pioneer Fund, 65 ALB. L. REV. 743 (2002). 
 128. See KUSHNER, supra note 122, at 17; see also Alexander, supra note 116, at 1235-
37, 1240-42, 1247-50 (examining how restrictive covenants served as a mechanism for so-
cial control and noting cases where courts upheld restrictive covenants); Lawrence B. De 
Graaf, The City of Black Angels: Emergence of the Los Angeles Ghetto 1890-1930, 39 PAC. 
HIST. REV. 323, 336-37 (1970); de Leeuw, supra note 122, at 356 (“Legally enforced segre-
gation outside of the South was a product of the twentieth century . . . .”); Tom I. Romero, 
Kelo, Parents and the Spatialialization of Color (Blindness) in the Berman-Brown Metro-
politan Heterotopia, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 947, 957 (2008); Rubinowitz & Shelton, supra 
PENNISI_CHRISTENSEN 10/13/2010  6:54 PM 
2010] FHA SECTION 3604(b) AFTER MODESTO 1101 
and intimidation,129 fearful blacks moved to minority areas, which became 
concentrated ghettos.130  African American residents who attempted to re-
locate to white neighborhoods faced strong retaliation ranging from vitriol-
ic letters131 to bombings.132  Throughout the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury, racial dissonance over housing escalated and riots eventually swept 
through major cities.133  Today, minorities continue to face threats, harass-
 
note 122.  In 1935, the Federal Housing Administration required its contractors to adhere to 
a model racially restrictive covenant. See MEYER, supra note 123, at 7; Rachel Kurth, Strik-
ing a Balance Between Protecting Civil Rights and Free Speech on the Internet: The Fair 
Housing Act vs. The Communications Decency Act, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 805, 
807-08 (2007); see also Terry A.C. Gray, De-Concentrating Poverty and Promoting Mixed-
Income Communities in Public Housing: The Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act 
of 1998, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 173, 174 (1999).  “Restrictive covenants are contractual 
agreements among property owners restricting the use of land; they can be enforced against 
the signatories and their successors in interest with a damages remedy. Racially restrictive 
covenants typically prohibited property owners from selling, occupying, or leasing their 
property to Blacks and Hispanics.” Godsil, supra note 125, at 1843-44 (citing JESSE DUKE-
MINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 858-59 (5th ed. 2002)).  Local governments’ zoning 
ordinances also included these types of covenants to prevent integration in response to 
mounting racially motivated violence. MEYER, supra note 123, at 8.  The Supreme Court 
eventually outlawed racially restrictive covenants. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 23 
(1948). 
 129. See, e.g., BIGHAM, supra note 122, at 113-14 (describing “outbursts of hostility to 
those few blacks who dared to consider moving into regions tacitly understood as for whites 
only”); De Graaf, supra note 128, at 336, 346; de Leeuw, supra note 122, at 356; Romero, 
supra note 128; see also Harper v. Hunter Coll., No. 95 Civ. 10388, 1999 WL 147698, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15 1999). 
 130. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 65, at 34-35; see also Phyllis E. Bernard, Okla-
homa: The New Africa, 26 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 901, 903 (2001). See generally supra note 
112 and accompanying text.  Both the private and public sectors contributed to white flight, 
suburbanization, and the rise of urban ghettos. See Douglas, supra note 123, at 372-74.  The 
government also used public housing as a “tool to accomplish racial segregation.” Kenn, 
supra note 124; see also Douglas, supra note 123, at 372-73. See generally JOHN YINGER, 
CLOSED DOORS, OPPORTUNITIES LOST (1995). 
 131. See MEYER, supra note 123, at 34.  Real estate agents also offered to help quell “im-
pending invasion[s].” MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 65, at 37-38; Godsil, supra note 125, 
at 1844. 
 132. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 65, at 35.  “The racial issue was becoming cen-
tered around the home, the most emotional possession of the American family . . . .” 
CHARLES ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS 8 (1955); see also Godsil, supra note 125, at 
1839 (“[A]nyone seeking to transgress racial boundaries was subject to violence . . . .”); 
Leonard S. Rubinowitz & Imani Perry, Crimes Without Punishment: White Neighbors’ Re-
sistence To Black Entry, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335, 346-47 (2001); Rubinowitz & 
Shelton, supra note 122, at 675. 
 133. See ABRAMS, supra note 132, at 87 (listing examples of nationwide race-based hous-
ing violence); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 65, at 30, 34-35 (“In white eyes, black people 
belonged in black neighborhoods . . . .”); MEYER, supra note 123, at 30-35; Richard H. 
Chused, Euclid’s Historical Imagery, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597, 607-08 (2001); Godsil, 
supra note 125, at 1839 n.192 (listing urban race riots); Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: 
Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-Century Race Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1923, 1969 
(2000) (“Race riots, like lynchings, performed the function of protecting white symbolic and 
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ment, and violence over housing.134  In many areas, housing remains segre-
gated, particularly in large cities with long histories of racial discord such 
as New York and Detroit.135 
The next section will discuss the theories that courts use to interpret sta-
tutes, which will provide a background for the examination of cases inter-
preting the FHA in Part II. 
B. Theories of Statutory Interpretation 
This section discusses interpretive theories that courts utilize in adjudi-
cating questions of statutory law.  In applying statutory law such as the 
FHA, courts primarily begin by interpreting the statute and inquiring into 
its meaning.136  Theories of statutory interpretation guide a court’s inquiry 
by providing “coherent method[s] for explaining what occurs when judges 
decide cases correctly.”137 
1. Meaning-Based Theories 
Meaning-based methods of statutory interpretation require courts to un-
cover a statute’s meaning by determining how certain readers would under-
stand its language.138  Under plain meaning theories, the binding law only 
 
material interests.”); Klarman, supra note 126, at 910; Kurth, supra note 128, at 808; Mari 
Matsuda, Planet Asian America, 8 ASIAN L.J. 169, 175 n.30 (2001) (providing examples of 
racial violence in several cities); S. Alan Ray, A Race or a Nation? Cherokee National Iden-
tity and the Status of Freedmen’s Descendants, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 387, 410 (2007) (ex-
plaining racially motivated riots in Oklahoma); see also Alberto B. Lopez, Focusing the Re-
parations Debate Beyond 1865, 69 TENN. L. REV. 653, 674-75 (2002). See generally 
Danney Goble, Final Report of the Oklahoma Commission to Study the Tulsa Race Riot of 
1921 (2001), available at http://www.tulsareparations.org/FinalReport.htm. 
 134. See YINGER, supra note 130, at 112-13 (providing indices of segregation for a varie-
ty of cities). 
 135. See id. 
 136. See, e.g., Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 
713 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing the statutory language first); see also Karl Llewellyn, Re-
marks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes are 
to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950), reprinted in 5 GREEN BAG 297, 302 (2002) 
(“[T]he accepted convention still, unhappily requires discussion as if only one single correct 
meaning could exist.”). 
 137. Benjamin Lin, Conspiracy! Section 1985(3) Political-Patronage Discrimination and 
the Quest for Purpose, 9 J. L. SOC’Y 211, 224-25 (2008). 
 138. See Lawrence Zelenak, Thinking About Nonliteral Interpretations of the Internal 
Revenue Code, 64 N.C. L. REV. 623, 634 (1986) (“Under a meaning theory, the standard of 
interpretation is how the statute would be understood by a hypothetical appropriate read-
er.”); see also James Boyd White, Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 
60 TEX. L. REV. 415, 435 (1982) (“[W]e can ask what [the statute] means in a different way: 
how would the ideal reader contemplated by this document, indeed constituted by it, under-
stand its bearing in the present circumstances?”). 
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includes the statute’s text, not its legislative intent.139  Under this approach, 
courts only evaluate the “literal” or “natural” meaning of the disputed lan-
guage and disregard its legislative intent.140  If the statute is unclear, a court 
discerns the meaning of the words in dispute and applies the statute based 
on the meaning that it determines.141  Courts typically identify the statute’s 
meaning as the “presumed” or “obvious” legislative intent, suggesting that 
the legislature “intended what it expressed and intended nothing more than 
what it expressed.”142  In applying the words of a statute, courts emphasize 
that judges should defer to the legislature’s “supremacy,” even if it may 
have drafted the statue with “greater clarity or foresight” because courts 
lack the authority “to redraft statutes . . . to achieve that which Congress is 
perceived to have failed to do.”143  Some commentators maintain that plain 
 
 139. See Lin, supra note 137, at 225-26; see also LINDA D. JELLUM & DAVID CHARLES 
HRICIK, MODERN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: PROBLEMS, THEORIES, AND LAWYERING 
STRATEGIES 35-38 (2006) (“[S]tatutory interpretation: the words.  It begins at the atomic 
level, with interpretation of individual words, punctuation, and grammar . . . . [J]udges often 
write that they simply determine the plain and ordinary meaning of the words in issue.”). 
 140. See 5A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION § 48A:15 (6th ed. 2009) (citing Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441, 446-47 
(1936); Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U.S. 85, 89 (1935); Wilbur v. United 
States ex rel. Vindicator Consol. Gold Mining Co., 284 U.S. 231, 237 (1931); Banco Mex-
icano v. Deutsche Bank, 263 U.S. 591, 602 (1924); R.R. Comm’n. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. 
Co., 257 U.S. 563, 588-89 (1922); Pennsylvania R. R. v. Int’l Coal Mining Co., 230 U.S. 
184 (1913); Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U.S. 418, 430 (1904); Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 US 
414, 419 (1899); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 353 (1897)) 
(“Thus, in representative opinions, the Supreme Court has employed the plain meaning doc-
trine as a rule of exclusion, barring the presentation, as aids to interpretation, of committee 
reports, records of the legislative history of an act, administrative construction, and other 
sources extrinsic to the text of an enactment.”); Lin, supra note 137, at 231 n.67; see also 
Matson Nav. Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 352, 356 (1932) (“As the words of the [statute] 
are plain, we are not at liberty to add to or alter them to effect a purpose which does not ap-
pear on its face or from its legislative history.”); United States v. Mo. Pac. R. R., 278 U.S. 
269, 278 (1929) (“[W]here the language of an enactment is clear, and construction accord-
ing to its terms does not lead to absurd or impracticable consequences, the words employed 
are to be taken as the final expression of the meaning intended.”). See generally Rev. Robert 
John Araujo, S.J., Method in Interpretation: Practical Wisdom and the Search for Meaning 
in Public Legal Texts, 68 MISS. L.J. 225 (1998). 
 141. See JELLUM & HRICIK, supra note 139, at 35 (“[S]tatutory interpretation: the words.  
It begins at the atomic level, with interpretation of individual words, punctuation, and 
grammar.”); see also Letter from Justice Holmes, reprinted in Felix Frankfurter, Some Ref-
lections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 538 (1947) (“I don’t care what 
[the legislature’s] intention was.  I only want to know what the words mean.”); Lin, supra 
note 137, at 226. 
 142. Vincent A. Wellman, Dworkin and the Legal Process Tradition: The Legacy of Hart 
and Sacks, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 413, 457-58 (1987). 
 143. United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95 (1985). 
While we will not allow a literal reading of the statute to produce a result “demon-
strably at odds with the intentions of its drafters,” . . . [t]o attempt to decide 
whether some date other than the one set out in the statute is the date actually “in-
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meaning interpretation ensures consensus and predictability.144  Other 
judges and scholars criticize it as incoherent and misleading.145  Courts do 
not adhere to the plain meaning rule if it would produce absurd results or 
“[a] grave injustice.”146 
Textualism is another meaning-based theory.147  Scalia’s textualist 
school maintains that every word has a range of meanings.148  It directs 
judges to interpret a statute exclusively through its words and avoid extra-
legal textual references, even if the interpreter faces contrary judicial inter-
pretations over the same language, a drafting mistake, or incongruent views 
among government agencies.149  Unlike plain meaning theories, a textualist 
judge evaluates both the particular language of a provision and refers to re-
 
tended” by Congress is to set sail on an aimless journey . . . . [D]eference to the 
supremacy of the legislature, as well as recognition that Congressmen typically 
vote on the language of a bill, generally requires us to assume that the “legislative 
purpose is expressed . . . .” 
Id. at 93-95 (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)). 
 144. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Why Plain Meaning?, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1565, 
1581 (1997). 
 145. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Strict Textualism, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 13, 25, 36 
(1995) (describing the plain meaning rule as “intellectually incoherent” and “institutionally 
impermissible”); see also Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, 
Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1249, 1249 (1997) (distinguishing between 
“fidelity to the Constitution’s text and fidelity to past constitutional practice”). But see 
James Fagan, The Legal Phoenix: The Plain Meaning Rule is Dead, Long Live the Rule!, 29 
CAL. W. L. REV. 373, 392 (1993). 
 146. Anthony D’Amato, Counterintuitive Consequences of “Plain Meaning,” 33 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 529, 576 (1991) (“[W]hen it would be unjust to follow a rule, then the courts should 
throw away literalness, ‘plain language,’ textualism, and all other seductive trappings of 
formalism, and do what they are supposed to do: dispense justice to the parties.”); see also 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-2 (West 2010); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3238 n.5 
(2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The Court attempts to avoid [] absurd results . . . .”); Car-
penters Dist. Council v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 15 F.3d 1275, 1285 (5th Cir. 1994) (“A 
well-accepted canon of statutory construction requires the reviewing court to avoid any in-
terpretation that would lead to absurd or unreasonable outcomes.”); Lange v. United States, 
443 F.2d 720, 722-23 (D.C. Cir. 1971); DeCoteau v. Sentry Ins. Co., 915 F. Supp. 155, 157 
(D. N.D. 1996) (“When adherence to the plain terms of a statute would lead to an absurd 
result, the court can look to the intent of Congress and interpret the statute to fulfill that in-
tent and avoid the absurd result.”); Johnson Serv. Co. v. H. S. Kaiser Co., 324 F. Supp. 745, 
749 (N.D. Ill. 1971); 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45:12 (7th ed.) (“It is 
fundamental, however, that departure from the literal construction of a statute is justified 
when such a construction would produce an absurd and unjust result and would clearly be 
inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the act in question.”); J. Woodfin Jones, The 
Absurd Results Principle of Statutory Construction in Texas, 15 REV. LITIG. 81 (1996). 
 147. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 23 (1997). 
 148. Id. at 23-24. 
 149. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 241-42 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(consulting a dictionary for the definition of “use”); McBoyle v. United States, 43 F.2d 273, 
274 (10th Cir. 1930). 
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lated legal texts, such as other provisions in the same statute or other re-
lated texts that address the same issue.150  Like plain meaning, textualism 
has also met with an avalanche of criticism.151 
 
 150. See Smith, 508 U.S. at 229 (O’Connor, J.) (noting that language “cannot be inter-
preted apart from context”); Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 912 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); Pan. Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 439 (1939) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he meaning of a statute is to be looked for, not in any single section, but in all the parts 
together and in their relation to the end in view.”); Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810-
11 (2d Cir. 1942) (Hand, J.) (“[T]he meaning of a sentence may be more than that of the 
separate words, as a melody is more than the notes, and no degree of particularity can ever 
obviate recourse to the setting in which all appear, and which all collectively create.”); see 
also R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.) (where the Supreme Court of Canada ap-
plied the textualist approach to a criminal statute and the Canadian Charter of Rights); SCA-
LIA, supra note 147, at 16 (“[A]mbiguities in a newly enacted statute are to be resolved in 
such fashion as to make the statute . . . internally consistent, [and] compatible with previous-
ly enacted laws.”); Araujo, supra note 140 (“[T]he interpreter is concerned with the com-
plete fabric of the text, i.e., the entire body of law that relates to the issue under considera-
tion.”); Llewellyn, supra note 136 (“Statutes in pari materia must be construed together.”); 
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia’s Textualism: The “New” New Legal Process, 12 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 1597, 1615, 1620-22 (1991) (noting that Scalia’s textualism extends beyond 
“the enacted statute” to examine “the text of other related statutes,” and concluding that Sca-
lia “views the entire United States Code . . . as a product of a perfectly rational[,] . . . sensi-
ble[,] . . . [and] omniscient legislature”). 
 151. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson/Ctr. Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 516 n.8 (1992) 
(Souter, J., plurality opinion) (“‘The meaning of . . . a statute cannot be gained by confining 
inquiry within its four corners.  Only the historic process of which such legislation is an in-
complete fragment—that to which it gave rise as well as that which gave rise to it—can 
yield its true meaning.’” (quoting United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 432 (1943) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting))); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING 
THE REGULATORY STATE 113-14 (1990) (arguing that “the textualist approach is inadequate” 
because “words are not self-defining; their meaning depends on both culture and context”); 
William N. Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 661-64 (1990) (criti-
quing new textualist approaches and arguing that they “rest upon precepts of grammar and 
logic, proceduralism, and federalism”); William Funk, Faith in Texts—Justice Scalia’s In-
terpretation of Statutes and the Constitution: Apostasy for the Rest of Us?, 49 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 825, 845-46 (1997) (maintaining that textualism provides little guidance when the sta-
tute “truly remains ambiguous”); Thomas W. Merrill, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Pluralist 
Theory, and the Interpretation of Statutes, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 621, 662 (1994) (“[M]any of the 
interpretative techniques relied upon most extensively by Justice Scalia presuppose . . . that 
Congress is a perfect grammarian, that different provisions of a statute reflect a single, uni-
fied structure, that words are used the same way in different statutes, and that Congress is 
familiar with all provisions in the United States Code.” (citations omitted)); Richard J. 
Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court’s New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and In-
coherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 764-76 (1995) (criticizing 
the Court’s “hypertextualism”); Peter L. Strauss, The Courts and the Congress: Should 
Judges Disdain Political History?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 242, 245 (1998) (maintaining that 
courts should be “cautious about proposing principles of interpretation that . . . devalue 
knowing the context within which the legislature has spoken”); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, the Two Faces of Ultra-Pluralism, and the Originalist Fallacy, 25 RUTG-
ERS L.J. 679, 681-82 (1994) (finding that “[t]he subsequent legislative history and more re-
cently enacted statutes increase the sources of interpretive information and require the judge 
to inject fewer of her personal opinions”). 
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2. Intent-Based Theories 
Intent-based approaches call upon judges to ask: “what was the ‘intent of 
the drafter’ in enacting the statute or other normative legal text?”152  Intent 
refers to the meaning that the institution or drafters imposed on a statute 
when selecting its particular words,153 and the surrounding circumstances 
that propelled its drafting.154  In utilizing intent-based methods to interpret 
a statute, a judge determines and enforces the legislature’s collective in-
tent155 by assessing the statute’s legislative history and analyzing how the 
drafters intended the statute to be applied during its enactment.156  To eva-
luate legislative history, a judge consults legislative committee reports in-
volved in the drafting process, contemporaneous history of events that oc-
 
 152. Araujo, supra note 140; see also Lon L. Fuller, Human Purpose and Natural Law, 
53 J. PHIL. 697, 700 (1956); Zelenak, supra note 138 (“Under an intent theory, the standard 
of interpretation is the intent of the legislature that enacted the statute.”). 
 153. See Araujo, supra note 140; see also 5A SINGER & SINGER, supra note 140, at § 
48:4. 
 154. 5A SINGER & SINGER, supra note 140, at § 48:4. 
 155. See Lin, supra note 137, at 226-28; see also Araujo, supra note 140. 
 156. See, e.g., Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982) (“[The draf-
ters’] intentions must be controlling.”); United States v. Am. Trucking, 310 U.S. 534, 542 
(1940) (“In the interpretation of statutes, the function of the courts is easily stated. It is to 
construe the language so as to give effect to the intent of Congress.”); see also REED DICK-
ERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 36-37 (1975) (“[W]e are inter-
ested in the intended meaning of the author in the sense that the process of communication 
makes no sense unless some intention can be attributed to him.  Intended meaning, there-
fore, remains the ultimate object of search even though no method has yet been devised by 
which this meaning can be directly known.”); Lin, supra note 137, at 226-28; Zelenak, su-
pra note 138 (“Under an intent theory, the standard of interpretation is the intent of the leg-
islature that enacted the statute.”).  Intent-based theories are distinguishable from purposive 
theories.  Courts using purposive theories interpret statutes by ascertaining the goals that the 
drafters designed the text to accomplish. See DICKERSON, supra, at 88; see also Araujo, su-
pra note 140.  Purpose refers to “general understanding of the legislature which acknowl-
edges the existence of some actual or potential situation [that] the text was designed to ad-
dress by establishing guidelines that would be followed to address these situations in the 
future.” Id.  While legislative intent focuses on the drafters’ consciousness of the circums-
tances that motivated the legislation, purpose focuses on the text’s future goals. Id.  Karl 
Llewellyn, a distinguished jurisprudential scholar and prominent legal realist, wrote, “[i]f a 
statute is to make sense, it must be read in the light of some assumed purpose.”  Llewellyn, 
supra note 136, at 400. See generally KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR 
LAW AND ITS STUDY (1930); WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MO-
VEMENT (1973).  The purposive interpreter evaluates how the drafters would apply the sta-
tute to the case at bar by assessing both the statute’s legislative intent and defined purposes 
in the context of the case. M.B.W. Sinclair, Law and Language: The Role of Pragmatics in 
Statutory Interpretation, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 373, 420 (1985).  The interpreter relates the 
case’s facts to the issues that the drafters faced more abstractly than when they originally 
wrote it, and then concludes whether the statute was designed to regulate the particular situ-
ation. Id. 
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curred during and after enactment, and prior drafts of the statute.157  In de-
ciding whether a particular source constitutes part of a statute’s legislative 
history, courts inquire into whether the source was “generally available” 
and “relied upon by the legislator in passing the bill.”158  Like meaning-
based theories, intent-based theories maintain that the statute reflects the 
legislature’s intent and contains an answer to the legal question, so that the 
judge “take[s] the actual situation . . . and tailor[s] it to conform to . . . 
preexisting dictates.”159  According to Judge Posner, if the legislative histo-
ry is silent, a judge must “imagine as best he can how [the drafters] would 
have wanted it applied to situations that they did not foresee.”160 
Courts interpreting civil rights legislation often applied intent-based 
theories.161 
However, some commentators have found that intent-approaches suffer 
from problems of “epistemology, aggregation and projection.”162  Courts 
cannot definitively divine the motivation of each legislator for voting in fa-
 
 157. See United States v. Wyoming, 331 U.S. 440, 451-52 (1947) (considering historic 
events after enactment); Markham v. Cabell, 326 U.S. 404, 407-08 (1945) (reviewing the 
contemporaneous wording); United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 186 (2d Cir. 2002); In 
re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908, 912 n.3 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[O]fficial committee reports . . . provide 
the authoritative expression of legislative intent.”); Mills v. United States, 713 F.2d 1249, 
1252 (7th Cir. 1983) (“[C]ommittee reports represent the most persuasive indicia of Con-
gressional intent (with the exception, of course, of the language of the statute itself).”). 
 158. 5A SINGER & SINGER, supra note 140, at § 48:4; see also Resolution Trust Corp. v. 
Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416, 421-22 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 159. Lin, supra note 137, at 228; see also Daniel A. Farber & Philip Frickey, Legislative 
Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 468-69 (1988); Earl M. Maltz, Statutory In-
terpretation and Legislative Power: The Case for a Modified Intentionalist Approach, 63 
TUL. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1988). 
 160. Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Cour-
troom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 818 (1983). 
 161. 5A SINGER & SINGER, supra note 140, at § 45.05 (suggesting that most courts favor 
intent-based theories).  For instance, while interpreting the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Re-
gents of the University of California v. Bakke, Justice Powell considered Congress’ intent to 
“halt federal funding of entities that violate a prohibition of racial discrimination.” 438 U.S. 
265, 284 (1978). 
 162. Wellman, supra note 142, at 454; see also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 284 (noting “it is easi-
er to discern legislative intent the closer in time the interpretation is to the enactment of the 
statute” and that “[a]s time passes, the ability to identify something about the legislature’s 
intent becomes increasingly difficult”).  Epistemologically, courts can never conclusively 
know the individual legislators’ actual motivations that led them to vote on a bill. Id.  The 
problem of “aggregation” refers to a judge’s inability to derive a group’s collective intent 
from a select number of individual motivations. Id.  Finally, the “projection” problem relates 
to the original drafters’ inability to foresee all future disputes that might arise from applica-
tions of the statute, even if a judge can discern a group’s collective intent. Id.  Because a 
legislature cannot possibly predict or account for all situations that the statute may apply to, 
courts are often left to apply the statute to unforeseen problems as they arise without signifi-
cant legislative input. Id. 
PENNISI_CHRISTENSEN 10/13/2010  6:54 PM 
1108 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVII 
vor of a bill with particular language.163  Lin posits, “perhaps it was a par-
ticularly bad cup of coffee or perhaps a persuasive argument.”164  In addi-
tion, while voting for the statute, the legislature could not possibly foresee 
all future disputes.165  If the legislature never foresaw the dispute, its intent 
or language might not be dispositive.166  Furthermore, although the legisla-
ture passed a statute with particular language, it did not enact a particular 
version of “intent” into law.167  Overall, many commentators and courts 
have critiqued the reliability of intent-based methods.168 
 
 163. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 284. 
 164. Lin, supra note 137, at 227. 
 165. See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201-02 (1979); In re 
Application to Quash Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on the Museum of Mod-
ern Art, 177 Misc. 2d 985, 991 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) (citing N.Y. STAT. LAW § 239(b) 
(McKinney 1971)); FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 110 (1839) (not-
ing that the legislatures “cannot foresee all possible complex cases”); Jeffrey Barnes, The 
Continuing Debate About “Plain Language” Legislation: A Law Reform Conundrum, 27 
STATUTE L. REV. 83, 93 (2006); Randall R. Bovbjerg & Joel M. Schumm, Judicial Policy 
and Quantitative Research: Indiana’s Statute of Limitations for Medical Practitioners, 31 
IND. L. REV. 1051, 1082 (1998) (“Legislatures can gather facts about whole populations af-
fected by a phenomenon or social system, consider budgetary implications, and generally do 
a broad cost-benefit analysis across all types of cases to be affected in light of perceived 
popular and political opinion and pressures—though they cannot foresee all implementation 
problems or unexpected consequences of their decisions.”); Bryan T. Camp, Bound by the 
BAP: The Stare Decisis Effects of BAP Decisions, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1643, 1671 (1997) 
(“[T]he reality is that the legislature cannot foresee all contingencies and may deliberately 
avoid providing even for those it can foresee because it is unable to make hard political 
choices.”); Henry H. Drummonds, The Dance of Statutes and the Common Law: Employ-
ment, Alcohol, and Other Torts, 36 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 939, 959 (2000) (“Legislators, be-
ing human, cannot possibly foresee all the myriad situations in which a statutory duty finds 
expression in common law cases.”); Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 
NW. U. L. REV. 877, 927 (1999) (“Legislatures create general laws both because they cannot 
foresee every variation that may arise and also because legislators may have competing 
views about what should be included in legislation and must settle for broad language if any 
laws are to be passed.”); Katherina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, ‘Incomplete Law,’ 35 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 931, 933 (2003) (maintaining that drafters cannot write a complete law); 
Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341, 392 
(2010); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. 
REV. 1669, 1675 (1975); Michal Tamir, Public Law as a Whole and Normative Duality: 
Reclaiming Administrative Insights in Enforcement Review, 12 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 43, 48 
(“[T]he legislature cannot foresee all the eventualities . . . required to implement legisla-
tion.”); Loren Speziale, Comment, Walking Through the New Jersey Equine Activity Sta-
tute: A Look at Judicial Statutory Interpretation in Jurisdictions with Similar Limited Liabil-
ity Laws, 12 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 65, 84 (2002). 
 166. See Lin, supra note 137, at 227. 
 167. Wellman, supra note 142, at 454-55. 
 168. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTER-
PRETATION 211-47 (2000) (describing the debate over whether courts should reference legis-
lative history to justify their holdings); John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 
91 VA. L. REV. 419, 424-25 (2005); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 
863 (1930). 
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3. Alternative Theory: Coherency Theory 
In response to problems that arise from other interpretive methods and 
their inadequacy in resolving hard cases of statutory law, Ronald Dworkin 
advanced an alternative theory called Coherence Theory.169  It provides a 
neo-natural law method for resolving difficult statutory disputes.170  Dwor-
kin explains his interpretive theory using a fictional character named Her-
cules,171 a judge and lawyer of “superhuman skill . . . [who] accepts . . . un-
controversial . . . rules . . . [and] accepts . . . that statutes have the general 
power to create and extinguish legal rights, and that judges have the general 
duty to follow earlier decisions.”172  He acknowledges other methods of in-
terpretation but presents Hercules’ approach as the best for resolving “hard 
cases.”173 
Coherence Theory maintains that there are two conceptions of legislative 
intent: institutionalized intention and collective understanding.174  “Institu-
tionalized intention” refers to a policy or principle enacted with a statute, 
either in its preamble or committee reports, which becomes part of the leg-
islation by the legislature’s express decision.175  The legislature’s procedure 
to enact the statute legitimizes its institutional intentions, rather than each 
drafter’s motive.176  In contrast, collective understanding represents a pure-
ly psychological concept combining the individual legislatures’ beliefs.177  
Dworkin objects to collective understanding and posits that a judge should 
interpret a statute to advance the policies or principles that furnish the best 
 
 169. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) [hereinafter 
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY]. 
 170. See Ronald A. Dworkin, “Natural” Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165, 165-66 
(1982). Natural law theories are normative and strive to explain what the law ought to be. 
See Deryck Beyleveld & Roger Brownsword, The Practical Difference Between Natural-
Law Theory and Legal Positivism, 5 OXFORD J.L. STUD. 1, 3 (1985).  These theories are 
contrary to positivist legal theories such as the “Legal Process School” advanced by H.L.A. 
Hart, which seek to describe the law as it is. Id. 
 171. The name of Dworkin’s hypothetical judge, Hercules, refers to a legendary ancient 
Greek mythological figure designated as the world’s greatest hero renowned for his extraor-
dinary strength, virtue, piety, courageousness, and dedication to protecting the common 
people. JOHN LEMPRIÈRE, A CLASSICAL DICTIONARY (8th ed., 1812); see also JOHN LEM-
PRIÈRE, LEMPRIÈRE’S CLASSICAL DICTIONARY OF PROPER NAMES MENTIONED IN ANCIENT 
AUTHORS 274-75 (1984).  In particular, Hercules performed twelve seemingly impossible 
assignments, the “Twelve Labors of Hercules.” Id.  In using the name “Hercules,” Dworkin 
positions his hypothetical judge as an ideal. 
 172. TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 169, at 105-06. 
 173. Id. at 107-08. 
 174. See MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 24, at 320-21. 
 175. Id. at 320. 
 176. Id. at 321. 
 177. Id. at 321-22. 
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political justification for the statute consistent with its provisions and the 
political ethos that prevailed during its enactment.178 
Where two equally tenable justifications for a statute exist, Dworkin di-
rects judges to revert to principles of morality and examine the legislation’s 
context.179  According to Dworkin, a judge should not exclusively rely 
upon legislative intent,180 but “must ultimately rely on his own opinions in 
developing and applying a theory about how to read a statute.”181  When 
evaluating a statute, Dworkin calls judges to interpret “history in mo-
tion”182 and uphold “his convictions about justice . . . [and] his convictions 
about the ideals of political integrity and fairness and procedural due 
process . . . .”183  A judge must consider a statute’s coherent development 
by developing “a more accurate or more sensitive or sounder analysis of 
[its] underlying moral principles.”184  In Dworkin’s view, law is “construc-
tive” and “aims, in the interpretive spirit, to lay principle over practice to 
show the best route to a better future, keeping the right faith with the past.  
It is, finally, a fraternal attitude, an expression of how we are united in 
community though divided in project, interest, and conviction.”185  In prac-
tice, judges strive to achieve this ideal in difficult cases, particularly those 
that present inequities.186  In A Matter of Principle,187 Dworkin contends 
 
 178. Id. at 327-28. 
 179. Id. at 328-29. 
 180. Dworkin introduces another hypothetical judge, Hermes, who is “almost as clever as 
Hercules and just as patient” and “accepts law as integrity” but adopts an intent-based inter-
pretive method, which seeks to discern the legislator’s “communicative will” when he or she 
voted in favor of the statute. See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 317 (1986) [hereinafter LAW’S 
EMPIRE].  Dworkin finds Hermes’ intent-based method problematic because the judge has 
no way of determining whose intention counts. Id. at 319. 
 181. Id. at 334. 
 182. Id. at 350. 
 183. Id. at 338-39. 
 184. See MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 24, at 328-29. 
 185. See LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 180, at 413. 
 186. E.g., Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 188-91 (N.Y. 1889) (considering a statute’s pur-
pose, evaluating how the legislatures would have decided the case if they had considered the 
facts in dispute in view of their overall goal, and ultimately applying the principle that the 
law should not allow a person to profit from his own wrongdoing where a grandson mur-
dered his grandfather and stood to inherit the majority of his estate under the Statute of 
Wills); see also Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting); 
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 102 (N.J. 1960) (applying the prin-
ciple of fairness over recognized contract law and refusing to allow a manufacturer to limit 
its liability for defective parts); LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 180, at 15-25.  In general, courts 
often apply “principle over practice” in particularly hard cases rather than simple applica-
tions law. See Jeremy B. Stein, Note, The Necessary Language of Exceptions: A Response 
To Frederick Schauer’s “Exceptions” 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 99, 124 n.75 (2007) 
(“[W]e might say cases in which a competing principle trumps a clearly applicable rule are 
not easy cases.”). 
PENNISI_CHRISTENSEN 10/13/2010  6:54 PM 
2010] FHA SECTION 3604(b) AFTER MODESTO 1111 
that the Supreme Court’s landmark interpretation of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,188 follows 
his Coherence Theory.189 
The next Part will discuss the cases that have interpreted FHA § 3604(b) 
and caused the split in authority over its applicability to post-acquisition 
claims.  All of the cases use intent-based and meaning-based theories to ar-
rive at their interpretations—not Dworkin’s Coherence Theory. 
II.  CIRCUIT SPLIT AFTER COMMITTEE CONCERNING COMMUNITY 
IMPROVEMENT V. CITY OF MODESTO 
This part will examine the recent federal cases that have led the circuit 
courts to diverge over whether post-acquisition claims are cognizable under 
§ 3604(b) where the discrimination in dispute has not resulted in construc-
tive eviction.  On October 8, 2009, the Ninth Circuit decided Committee 
Concerning Community Improvement v. City of Modesto and created a fed-
eral circuit split over whether § 3604(b) bans discrimination in providing 
services to existing homeowners and renters after they acquire their dwel-
lings.190  The Ninth Circuit191 and many district courts192 held that the FHA 
 
 187. See MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 24, at 320. 
 188. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
 189. See MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 24, at 319.  Citing the overarching policy of 
Title VII to improve “the economic inferiority of blacks and other minorities,” the Court 
held that a preferential training program did not violate Title VII because it was within the 
statute’s spirit and drafters’ intention, even though it was not within its “letter” or legislative 
history. Weber, 443 U.S. at 201.  Dworkin contends that “the question of how Title VII 
should be interpreted cannot be answered simply by staring at the words Congress used.” 
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 24, at 318.  He suggests that the majority’s interpretation 
reflects Coherence Theory, “suppos[ing] that a statute should be interpreted to advance the 
policies or principles that furnish the best political justification for [it].” Id. at 327.  In We-
ber, the underlying moral principle that the judges relied upon included fostering minorities’ 
economic equality. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1479, 1488-93 (1987).  Justice Brennan’s opinion focuses on how affirmative 
action programs will increase the percentage of minority workers employed by private firms 
and provide them with equal opportunities. See MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 24, at 
326-27.  In contrast, Justice Rehnquist’s dissent warns that affirmative action programs con-
tradict Title VII’s literal requirements because they express a discriminatory preference for 
one group over others. Id. at 324-26.  The statute was therefore indeterminate over whether 
Congress allowed affirmative action. Id.  Consistent with Coherence Theory, the majority 
resolved this indeterminacy through gap-filling the statute’s open texture and deciding be-
tween the statute’s competing underlying moral principles. Id.  It ultimately upheld the re-
medial hiring plan without displacing Congress’ goal of achieving equal opportunity. Id. 
 190. 583 F.3d 690, 716 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 191. See id. at 713. 
 192. See Richards v. Bono, No. 5:04CV484-OC-10GRJ, 2005 WL 1065141, at *3-4 
(M.D. Fla. May 2, 2005); United States v. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970, 977 (N.D. Cal. 2004); 
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applies to post-acquisition events.  In contrast, the Fifth193 and Seventh 
Circuits194 interpreted the FHA more narrowly, refusing to apply § 3604(b) 
to post-acquisition claims unless they amount to constructive eviction. 
A. Modesto and Other Federal Cases Applying FHA To Post-
acquisition Claims 
1. Modesto 
In Modesto, residents of four predominantly Latino neighborhoods sued 
the county and city of Modesto for violating FHA §3604(b).195 
a. Facts 
The plaintiffs’ neighborhoods are urban islands that are located outside 
of the city and consist of mid-twentieth century residential developments 
originally constructed without sewers, sidewalks, curbs, or gutters.196  By 
2000, Latino populations constituted a majority in the plaintiffs’ areas, 
which still lacked basic infrastructure.197  Infrastructure improvements re-
main at a standstill.  The City and County adopted a policy of annexing ur-
ban islands into the city, which provided the areas with municipal servic-
es.198  However, the plaintiffs’ territories have not been annexed because 
the city and county failed to enter the requisite independent tax-sharing 
agreement and excluded the islands from the “Master Tax Sharing Agree-
ment.”199  Meanwhile, the county remains hesitant to invest in the areas’ 
infrastructure without the city’s guarantee that it will eventually reach a 
 
Landesman v. Keys Condominium Owners Ass’n, No. C 04-2685, 2004 WL 2370638, at *6 
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2004).. 
 193. See Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 745 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 194. See Bloch v. Frischholz, 533 F.3d 562, 563-64 (7th Cir. 2008), aff’d in part and 
rev’d in part en banc, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009); Halprin v. Prairie Single Family 
Homes, 388 F.3d 327, 330 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 195. 583 F.3d at 696. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 696-97. 
 198. Id. at 697.  For an island to be annexed, the city and county must: (1) determine 
whether the island’s community desires annexation; (2) establish the percentage of property 
taxes that each government authority will receive; and (3) confirm that the island’s infra-
structure meets city standards. Id. 
 199. Id.  In 1983, to satisfy the second annexation requirement, the city and county en-
tered into a Master Tax Sharing Agreement (MTSA), which stipulated that upon annexation, 
the city would collect thirty-four percent of the annexed area’s property taxes and the county 
would receive the remainder. Id.  The MTSA excludes the plaintiffs’ areas. Id.  To annex 
them, the county and city must enter into an independent tax-sharing agreement. Id. at 697-
98. 
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tax-sharing agreement and annex the islands.200  The city’s “Measure A” 
and “Measure M” have further estranged the neighborhoods’ prospects of 
infrastructure development by prohibiting the city from extending sewer 
lines to or improving sewage facilities in urban islands without an advisory 
election.201  However, “substantial islands” are not eligible for “Measure 
M” votes until fiscal negotiations have ended.202  The City Council has dis-
cretion to designate areas as “substantial” or “insubstantial,” and has only 
imposed this infrastructure condition on predominantly Latino neighbor-
hoods.203 
Plaintiffs alleged that the city and county violated § 3604(b) by discri-
minating against majority Latino areas in providing municipal services.204  
They argued that the MTSA’s exclusion of their areas has dissuaded the 
county from improving infrastructure.205 Plaintiffs also contended that de-
fendants failed to provide adequate sewage facilities.206  Third, Plaintiffs 
complained of insufficient law enforcement services and slower emergency 
response times in majority Latino neighborhoods than in other areas.207  
The District Court held that § 3604(b) only applies to pre-acquisition 
claims.208  Plaintiffs then appealed to the Ninth Circuit.209 
 
 200. Id. at 697. 
 201. Id. at 698. 
 202. Id.  Fiscal negotiations would “require that the [c]ounty agree to install all non-
sewer infrastructure” to an area in compliance with city standards. Id.  In contrast, “insubs-
tantial islands” are entitled to a Measure M vote without fiscal negotiations. Id. 
 203. Id.  Meanwhile, majority white islands have had Measure M votes before building 
infrastructure and undertaking fiscal negotiations. Id. 
 204. Id. at 699. 
 205. Id. at 697.  Specifically, plaintiffs contended that the MTSA “imposes a chilling ef-
fect on [p]laintiffs’ [] annexation efforts[,] . . . deters infrastructure development[,] . . . and 
makes it relatively easier for residents of predominantly-White unincorporated areas . . . to 
become Modesto citizens.” Third Amended Complaint at ¶ 61, Comm. Concerning Cmty. 
Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690 (9th Cir. 2009) (Nos. 07-16715, 07-17407). 
 206. Modesto, 583 F.3d at 697.  In particular, Rouse-Colorado and Hatch-Midway have 
failing septic systems that cause untreated sewage to leach into groundwater. Id.  Conse-
quently, the city made an exception to the infrastructure condition and agreed with the 
County to build sewers in 2004. Id. at 699.  However, plaintiffs argued that the County dis-
criminatorily assigned greater priority to other infrastructure, such as storm drains, in areas 
where white residents predominate despite the crisis. Id.  Furthermore, the County post-
poned building infrastructure and sewer access in Hatch-Midway, but built infrastructure 
and sewers other neighborhoods such as Shackleford. Id. at 698. 
 207. Id. at 707-08. 
 208. Id. at 700. 
 209. Id at 696. 
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b. Holding 
The Ninth Circuit held that the District Court erred and claims based on 
discrimination occurring post-acquisition are indeed cognizable under § 
3604(b).210  The court began its analysis by considering § 3604(b)’s lan-
guage.  It concluded that the wording of the section’s prohibition of dis-
crimination in the “privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling” does not prec-
lude post-acquisition claims.211  Instead, the court found that the statute 
“implicates continuing rights, such as the privilege of quiet enjoyment of 
the dwelling” because many services and facilities are provided during the 
occupancy phase.212  Under a “natural reading” of the statute, the court thus 
determined that it covers claims concerning services or facilities provided 
after the initial acquisition.213 
The court then found that the Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment’s (HUD) regulation214 implementing § 3604(b) further supports the 
viability of post-acquisition claims under § 3604(b).215  According to the 
court, the regulation’s coverage of “[f]ailing or delaying maintenance or 
repairs of sale or rental dwellings” and “[l]imiting the use of privileges, 
services or facilities associated with a dwelling” suggests that § 3604(b) 
applies to post-acquisition claims because problems with “maintenance or 
repairs” or “services or facilities associated with a dwelling” typically sur-
 
 210. Id. at 711-13 (citing Ojo v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 565 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2009) (ad-
dressing discrimination in insurance rates for homeowners)); Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 
1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that an African-American woman who faced eviction 
notices after complaining of racial discrimination could raise an FHA claim). 
 211. Modesto, 583 F.3d at 713. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id.  
 214. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.65 (2010). 
 215. The regulation states: 
(a) It shall be unlawful, because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial 
status, or national origin, to impose different terms, conditions or privileges relat-
ing to the sale or rental of a dwelling or to deny or limit services or facilities in 
connection with the sale or rental of a dwelling. 
(b) Prohibited actions under this section include, but are not limited to: 
. . . . 
(2) Failing or delaying maintenance or repairs of sale or rental dwellings be-
cause of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national ori-
gin. 
. . . . 
(4) Limiting the use of privileges, services or facilities associated with a 
dwelling because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or na-
tional origin of an owner, tenant or a person associated with him or her. 
Id. 
PENNISI_CHRISTENSEN 10/13/2010  6:54 PM 
2010] FHA SECTION 3604(b) AFTER MODESTO 1115 
face after the dweller takes possession.216  The court warned that limiting § 
3604(b) to pre-acquisition claims would prevent the FHA from protecting 
dwellers against discrimination that interferes with their services or enjoy-
ment of their residences but falls short of constructive eviction.217 
The Ninth Circuit therefore held that the “FHA [§ 3604(b)] does apply to 
post-acquisition discrimination, and [that] the District Court erred in decid-
ing otherwise.”218  However, the court only reinstated plaintiffs’ FHA 
claims concerning law-enforcement and found that plaintiffs failed to pro-
vide evidence of disparate impact regarding sewer services and infrastruc-
ture.219 
2. Other Lower Federal Courts’ Interpretations of § 3604(b) 
Lower federal courts have also recognized that § 3604(b) applies to post-
acquisition claims.  In United States v. Koch,220 the District Court of Ne-
braska allowed plaintiff-tenants’ post-acquisition sexual harassment claims 
under § 3604 to proceed.221  Female tenants claimed that the defendants vi-
olated § 3604 by harassing and retaliating against them after they took pos-
session of rental properties.222  The court rejected other courts’ conclusions 
that § 3604 does not encompass post-acquisition claims.223  It found that 
those courts erroneously relied on unnecessarily narrow interpretations of 
Title VIII’s language and legislative history.224 
 
 216. Modesto, 583 F.3d at 713. 
 217. Id. at 714.  The court provided examples of absurd results that would occur in the 
post-acquisition phase, i.e., after a dweller purchased and moved into his or her dwelling, if 
§ 3604(b) only applied to pre-acquisition claims. Id.  
[I]t would not violate § 3604(b) for a condominium owners’ association to prevent 
a disabled person from using the laundry facilities or for a landlord to refuse to 
provide maintenance to his Hispanic tenants.  Similarly, it would not violate § 
3604(b) for a landlord to sexually harass a tenant or to raise the rent of only Jew-
ish tenants.  It would not violate § 3604(c) for a landlord to use racial slurs to or 
about existing tenants or to spray-paint such a slur on an occupant’s door.  Nor 
would it violate § 3604(c) for a homeowners association to print up flyers deni-
grating a particular resident due to her religious faith and post them throughout the 
neighborhood.  All of these behaviors would be beyond the law’s purview solely 
because of when they occurred. 
Id. (quoting Oliveri, supra note 31, at 32-33). 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 715. 
 220. 352 F. Supp. 2d 970 (D. Neb. 2004). 
 221. Id. at 977. 
 222. Id. at 971. 
 223. Id. at 976-77. 
 224. Id. 
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In reviewing the language of the statute, the court explained that the 
FHA should be “construed generously in order to promote the replacement 
of segregated ghettos with ‘truly integrated and balanced living pat-
terns.’”225  Citing authorities that advocate for a broader reading of the 
FHA, the court concluded, “it is difficult to imagine a privilege that flows 
more naturally from the purchase or rental of a dwelling than . . . residing 
therein; therefore the Fair Housing Act should be (and has been) read to 
permit the enjoyment of this privilege without discriminatory harass-
ment.”226  It also noted that “privileges of sale or rental” may encompass 
privileges of occupancy.227 
The court further justified its broad interpretation through the FHA’s 
legislative history.228  It maintained that congressional records “reflect [that 
Congress had] a deep concern about exclusionary housing practices” and 
“was motivated by a desire to eliminate discriminatory business practices 
that confined African-Americans to harsh inner-city living conditions.”229  
Noting that Congress sought to pass “‘measures that have teeth and mean-
ing, in the eyes of every American, black or white,’” the court found that 
restricting the FHA’s application to pre-acquisition claims would actually 
contravene Congress’ intent to promote racial integration in housing, em-
ployment, and education, expressed when passing the FHA.230  The court 
concluded that “a broad interpretation of the FHA . . . encompass[ing] post-
acquisition acts of discrimination is consistent with the Act’s language, its 
legislative history, and the policy ‘to provide . . . for fair housing through-
out the United States.’”231 
Finally, the court found that HUD’s regulation232 interpreting § 3617 
further supports the viability of post-acquisition claims under § 3604.233  
The court reasoned that the regulation prohibits discrimination occurring in 
the post-acquisition phase, including “[t]hreatening, intimidating or inter-
fering with persons in their enjoyment of a dwelling . . . .”234  The regula-
 
 225. Id. at 976 (quoting Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211-12 (1972) 
(citing 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (1968))). 
 226. Id. (citing Neudecker v. Boisclair Corp., 351 F.3d 361 (8th Cir. 2003); Krueger v. 
Cuomo, 115 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 1997); DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th 
Cir. 1996); Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1088-90 (10th Cir. 1993)). 
 227. Id. (citing Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes, 388 F.3d 327, 329 (7th Cir. 
2004)). 
 228. Id. at 976-77. 
 229. Id. at 977 (citing 114 CONG. REC. 2274-84, 2703-09, 3421-22 (1968)). 
 230. Id. at 978 (quoting 114 CONG. REC. 2276 (1968)). 
 231. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006)). 
 232. 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2) (2010). 
 233. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 979. 
 234. Id. 
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tion’s prohibition of these activities indicates that the FHA’s substantive 
provisions cover similar claims.235  Furthermore, the court conducted a 
Chevron analysis and found that the regulation was a valid and reasonable 
interpretation of the FHA.236 
Likewise, in Richards v. Bono,237 the Middle District Court of Florida 
held that a victim of sexual harassment could raise a claim under § 3604(b) 
where the harassment occurred after the victim rented the property.238  The 
court drew a sharp distinction between claims involving sales, which con-
stitute a “singular event,” and rentals, which involve continuous relation-
ships.239  According to the court, rentals involve a disparate power relation-
ship between a tenant and landlord, who has both duties and powers, such 
as the ability to provide services, increase rent, and evict.240  In the rental 
context, the court noted that discrimination may be ongoing and affect the 
“terms, condition, or privileges” or provision of services or facilities “in 
connection with” the dwelling.241  The court determined that § 3604(b) 
prohibits discrimination throughout the landlord-tenant relationship, even 
after the tenant takes possession.242 
To support its application of the statute to a post-acquisition claim of ha-
rassment, the court referenced the FHA’s “spirit” expressed in its “broad 
and inclusive language.”243  It found that a narrow interpretation of the sta-
tute allowing a landlord to raise rent based on a tenant’s sex would be 
“anomalous.”244  Similar to the Ninth Circuit, the court cited HUD’s regu-
lation implementing § 3604(b)245 and concluded that the court must defer 
 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at 980 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 842-43 (1984)).  Courts use Chevron’s two-part test established by Justice Stevens to 
decide whether to defer to an executive agency’s interpretation of a statute that it adminis-
ters. See id.; see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) 
(“[A]dministrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron 
deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make 
rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was 
promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”).  The reviewing court must (1) determine 
whether the statute is ambiguous and (2) whether the agency’s interpretation of the ambi-
guous statute is reasonable. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.  If the agency’s interpretation is 
reasonable, then the reviewing court must defer to it. Id.  For a detailed explanation of the 
Chevron analysis, see supra Part III.A.3. 
 237. No. 5:04CV484-OC-10GRJ, 2005 WL 1065141 (M.D. Fla. May 2, 2005). 
 238. Id. at *3-4. 
 239. Id. at *3. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. (citing Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211-12 (1972)). 
 244. Id. 
 245. 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(b) (2010). 
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to the regulation under Chevron, or read the statute consistent with the reg-
ulation.246  Therefore, the court held that § 3604(b) covers post-acquisition 
harassment claims.247 
Similarly, in Landesman v. Keys Condominium Owners Ass’n,248 the 
Northern District of California allowed plaintiffs to challenge a condomi-
nium association’s facility rules that allegedly discriminated against fami-
lies with children under § 3406(b).249  The court only ruled on the merits 
without providing a rationale.250 
B. Federal Cases Failing to Apply the § 3604(b) to Post-acquisition 
Claims 
Contrary to the Ninth Circuit, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have re-
fused to apply § 3604(b) to post-acquisition claims where the discrimina-
tion in dispute falls short of constructive eviction. 
1. Fifth Circuit 
In Cox v. City of Dallas,251 the Fifth Circuit held that post-acquisition 
claims are not cognizable under § 3604(b) unless they involve discrimina-
tion amounting to constructive eviction.252  African-American resident-
plaintiffs argued that the city of Dallas violated § 3604(b) by discriminato-
rily providing municipal services, particularly in enforcing its zoning laws 
and failing to prevent illegal dumping in their neighborhood.253  The dump-
ing lowered their homes’ resale values.254  In interpreting the FHA, the 
court considered the language of the statute, its purpose, and HUD’s im-
plementing regulations.255 
The court first considered whether § 3604(b)’s phrase “in connection 
with” referred to the “sale or rental of a dwelling” or the “dwelling” itself 
 
 246. Richards, 2005 WL 1065141, at *3-4 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)). 
 247. Id. 
 248. No. C-04-2685, 2004 WL 2370638 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2004). 
 249. Id. at *1-2.  Plaintiffs maintained that the association violated the FHA § 3604(b) 
by: (1) restricting children under the age of eighteen from using the main swimming pool; 
(2) limiting children under the age of fifteen from accessing the clubhouse, billiard room, 
and gym without adult supervision; and (3) prohibiting children under the age of sixteen 
from using gym equipment. Id. 
 250. See id. 
 251. 430 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 252. Id. at 745-46. 
 253. Id. at 736-40. 
 254. See id. at 740. 
 255. Id. at 746. 
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generally.256  It determined that a “grammatically superior” reading of the 
FHA indicates that the phrase “in connection with” refers to the “sale or 
rental.”257  The court subsequently considered the statute’s purposes and 
found that a broader reading would “unmoor[] the ‘services’ language from 
the ‘sale or rental’ language.”258  It concluded that such a reading would 
“push[] the FHA into a general anti-discrimination pose [similar to § 1983], 
creating rights for any discriminatory act which impacts property values—
say, for generally inadequate police protection in a certain area.”259  Ac-
cording to the court, in enacting the FHA, Congress narrowly targeted 
housing.260  It found that the FHA “remains a housing statute” only appli-
cable to housing discrimination.261  The court distinguished the FHA from 
§ 1983’s general discrimination prohibitions, explaining that the FHA “tar-
gets private activity, [and] does not require a governmental policy or cus-
tom . . . [or] proof of both discriminatory impact and intent.”262 
Finally, the court considered the language of HUD’s regulation imple-
menting § 3604(b), and noted that it repeats the language used in the 
FHA.263  The court thus concluded that the regulation prohibits conduct on-
ly as it “relat[es] to” or “in connection with [the] sale or rental of a dwel-
ling.”264  It held that the provision of services does not “relate to” and is not 
“in connection with” any sale or rental.265  Alternatively, the court deter-
mined that the regulation prohibited actions such as “using different leases 
or contracts for sale and failing to process an offer or application” because 
these actions are connected to the sale or rental of a dwelling.266  According 
to the court, “failing or delaying maintenance or repairs” is not sufficiently 
connected to the “sale or rental” unless the perpetrator’s goal is to “evict[] 
or constructively evict[] a tenant.”267  Relying on Woods-Drake v. Lun-
dy,268 the court maintained that § 3604(b) applies to a current owner or ren-
 
 256. Id. at 745. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. at 746. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. (considering 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(b) (2010)). 
 264. Id. at 745. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. at 746 n.37. 
 267. Id. 
 268. 667 F.2d 1198, 1201-02 (5th Cir. 1982) (sustaining a tenant’s claim against a lan-
dlord under § 3604(b) for imposing a “whites-only” condition on the tenant’s lease because 
it was analogous to constructive eviction and a discriminatory condition of the sale or ren-
tal). 
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ter’s claim alleging discrimination that amounted to actual or constructive 
eviction.269  However, the court determined that § 3604(b) does not apply 
to complaints concerning current dwellers’ value of their homes.270  There-
fore, the court held that current owners, who claim that discrimination in 
city services impacted their property’s value or habitability, do not have a 
right of action under § 3604(b).271 
2. Seventh Circuit 
a. Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes 
The Seventh Circuit similarly refused to apply § 3604(b) to post-
acquisition claims in Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes.272  Jewish 
residents in a suburban subdivision alleged that their homeowners’ associa-
tion and other service providers violated § 3604(b) by harassing them and 
vandalizing their property.273  Like the Fifth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit 
interpreted the statute by evaluating the language and legislative history of 
§ 3604(b).274  According to the court, when drafting the FHA, Congress 
was mainly concerned with housing access, not problems arising after sale 
or rental.275  Although it acknowledged that § 3604(b) might cover con-
structive evictions,276 the court found that the section’s language primarily 
deals with property access or “prevent[ing] people from acquiring proper-
ty.”277 
The court also explained that the legislative history affirms that the sta-
tute’s “words mean what they seem to mean.”278  Distinguishing Title VII, 
which applies to both current employees and job applicants,279 the court 
maintained that the FHA’s legislative history “contains no hint . . . of a 
 
 269. Cox, 430 F.3d at 746. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. 388 F.3d 327 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 273. Id. at 328.  The association’s president wrote “H-town property,” short for “Hymie 
Town,” on the plaintiffs’ wall, damaged trees and plants on their property and cut down a 
string of holiday lights. Id.  Defendants also applied chemicals to plaintiffs’ yard and im-
posed rules limiting their property use. Id.  Furthermore, defendants hindered plaintiffs’ ef-
forts to identify the vandal by: (1) removing flyers that they posted offering a reward; (2) 
destroying board meeting minutes; and (3) erasing a tape recording of a meeting during 
which the president threatened to “make an example” of plaintiffs. Id. 
 274. Id. at 328-30. 
 275. Id. at 329. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. at 328. 
 278. Id. at 330. 
 279. See, e.g., Herrnreiter v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 315 F.3d 742, 744-45 (7th Cir. 2002). 
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concern with anything but access to housing.”280  It noted that when Con-
gress passed the bill, homeowners and landlords “refus[ed] to sell or rent 
homes in desirable residential areas to members of minority groups.”281  
According to the court, Congress primarily sought to remedy the exclusion 
of minority groups and was not concerned with how landlords and home-
owners treated them after “they were included,” which the court refers to as 
the problem of “expulsion.”282  The court reasoned that the problem of ex-
pulsion was a “future problem,” which did not arise until after Congress 
enacted the FHA and “the law forced unwanted associations that might 
provoke efforts at harassment.”283  Therefore, the court concluded that § 
3604(b) only provides redress for discrimination that occurred during the 
pre-acquisition phase.284  Because the harassment in dispute occurred after 
plaintiffs acquired their dwellings, the court held that their claims were not 
cognizable under § 3604(b).285 
b. Bloch v. Frischholz 
The Seventh Circuit recently revisited the issue of post-acquisition 
claims in Bloch v. Frischholz.286  The Blochs argued that their condomi-
nium association’s rule prohibiting owners from placing “[m]ats, boots, 
shoes, carts or objects of any sort” outside their doors and its continuous 
removal of Jewish residents’ mezuzot violated § 3604(b).287  They con-
tended that because observant Jews must affix a mezuzah at every entrance 
of their residences, the board’s rule forbidding mezuzot constituted a con-
structive eviction.288 
The Seventh Circuit found that the rule was religiously neutral because it 
applied to “objects of any sort,” including Christmas ornaments, crucifixes, 
and mezuzot.289  The court characterized plaintiffs’ complaint as seeking “a 
 
 280. Halprin, 388 F.3d at 329 (citing Hearings on S. 1358, S. 2114, and S. 2280 Before 
the Subcomm. on Hous. & Urban Affairs of the S. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 90th 
Cong. passim (1967); 114 CONG. REC. 2274 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1968) (statement of Sen. 
Mondale)); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL 
RIGHTS PART II 1709-17, 1742-51, 1762, 1769 (1970). 
 281. Halprin, 388 F.3d at 329. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. at 330. 
 285. Id. 
 286. 533 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 2008), aff’d in part and rev’d in part en banc, 587 F.3d 771 
(7th Cir. 2009). 
 287. Id. at 563.  For a detailed recitation of the facts, see supra notes 3-14 and accompa-
nying text. 
 288. Bloch, 533 F.3d at 564. 
 289. Id. 
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religious exception to a neutral rule”—which the FHA does not re-
quire290— and refused to recognize “lack of accommodation” as a form of 
discrimination.291  Citing City of Boerne v. Flores292 and Board of Trustees 
of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,293 the court emphasized that “a 
neutral, exception-free rule is not discriminatory and is compatible with the 
Constitution’s free exercise clause.”294  Because the FHA only requires 
homeowners to make special accommodations for persons with disabilities 
and not for individuals’ race, sex, or religion, the court concluded that the 
word “discriminate” does not mean “failure to accommodate.”295  In justi-
fying the court’s narrow interpretation, Judge Easterbrook stated, “[o]ur job 
is not to make the law the best it can be, but to enforce the law actually 
enacted.”296 
In contrast, Judge Diane Wood’s dissent found the Blochs’ post-
acquisition claim admissible after examining the statute and related HUD 
regulation.297  The dissent objected to the majority’s characterization of the 
Blochs’ claim as seeking an exception to a neutral rule.298  Judge Wood ex-
plained that the rule’s coverage of mezuzot was a disputed material issue of 
fact.299  She contended that the Blochs presented a triable claim of inten-
tional discrimination because evidence suggested that the rule was not reli-
giously neutral and the Association’s “reinterpretation” and enforcement of 
the Hallway Rule was intentionally discriminatory.300 
In November 2009, the Seventh Circuit reheard the case en banc.301  
Reaffirming Halprin, the court acknowledged that victims of discrimina-
tion occurring in the post-acquisition phase may raise a claim under § 
3604(a) only where it makes the premises “unavailable” or constructively 
 
 290. Id. at 565. 
 291. Id. 
 292. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 293. 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
 294. Bloch, 533 F.3d at 565. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. (citing Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470 (2006)). 
 297. Id. at 570-73 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
 298. Id. at 572-73. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc).  The en banc panel 
agreed with Judge Wood’s dissent that the Blochs presented a triable claim for intentional 
discrimination. Id. at 783-84.  The court found that the association’s reinterpretation of the 
rule to exclusively target observant Jews transformed it from a religiously neutral rule into a 
discriminatory one that sought to deprive Jewish residents of a required religious practice. 
Id.  The court concluded that there were genuine issues of material fact for trial on the inten-
tional discrimination question and remanded the case on this issue. Id. at 787. 
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evicts the dweller.302  The court cited the statutory language, “otherwise 
make unavailable or deny,” which is separate from the “sale or rental” lan-
guage.303  In the court’s view, the “[a]vailability of housing is at the heart 
of § 3604(a).”304  The court also acknowledged that the right to inhabit a 
dwelling constitutes a “privilege of sale” under § 3604(b).305 
The court found that the Blochs did not have a constructive eviction 
claim.306  The court explained that constructive eviction does not force the 
tenant to “move out the minute the landlord’s conduct begins to render the 
dwelling uninhabitable,” but requires the tenant to vacate the premises 
within a reasonable time.307  Because the Blochs never vacated their dwel-
ling but instead stayed and resisted the board’s conduct for over a year, the 
court found that the board’s rule did not render their premises “unavaila-
ble.”308  However, the court declined to decide whether “unavailability” re-
quires the plaintiff to vacate the premises in order to establish a prima facie 
§ 3604 claim.309 
The court sustained plaintiffs’ § 3604(b) claim on the alternative theory 
that related their post-acquisition claim to their initial purchase of the 
unit.310  In other words, the court re-characterized the defendants’ post-
acquisition discrimination as pre-acquisition discrimination, which the Se-
venth Circuit recognizes as actionable under § 3604(b).  The court found 
that the discrimination related to the Blochs’ initial sale or rental because 
the Blochs agreed to be governed by the association when they purchased 
their dwellings.311  The court recognized the agreement as “a term or condi-
tion of sale,” which § 3604(b) covers because it encompasses claims of cur-
rent renters or owners concerning discrimination related to the initial 
sale.312 
 
 302. Id. at 776. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. at 779 (citing Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes, 388 F.3d 327, 329 (7th 
Cir. 2004)). 
 306. Id. at 777-79. 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. at 777. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. at 779-81. 
 311. Id. at 780 n.8 (“[A]s a condition precedent to purchasing or residing at Shoreline 
Towers Condominium Association, they explicitly agreed to be bound and governed by its 
Declaration and Bylaws.”). 
 312. Id. at 779-80 (citing Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[Sec-
tion] 3604(b) may encompass the claim of a current owner or renter for attempted and un-
successful discrimination relating to the initial sale or rental.”); Woods-Drake v. Lundy, 667 
F.2d 1198, 1201 (5th Cir. 1982) (“[W]hen a landlord imposes on white tenants the condition 
that they may lease his apartment only if they agree not to receive blacks as guests, the lan-
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The court explained that when condominium owners purchase their 
units, they submit to the condominium’s “Declaration,” which establishes 
“rights, easements, privileges, and restrictions.”313  Under the “Declara-
tion,” the board may impose rules that it “deem[s] advisable for the main-
tenance, administration, management, operation, use, conservation and 
beautification of the Property, and for the health comfort, safety and gener-
al welfare of the Unit Owners . . . .”314  Upon their purchase, plaintiffs 
agreed to be bound by the board’s present and future rules.315  The court 
identified the Blochs’ agreement to submit to the board’s rules as a “condi-
tion” of their purchase.316  It explained that the board’s power to limit own-
ers’ rights in the future “flow[ed] from the terms of the sale.”317  The court 
held that because the Blochs purchased the unit “subject to the condition 
that the Condo Association can enact rules that restrict the buyer’s rights in 
the future” and they argued that the board discriminated against them using 
its power, “§ 3604(b) prohibits the board from discriminating against the 
Blochs through its enforcement of the rules, even facially neutral rules.”318 
The court distinguished the Blochs’ claim from that in Halprin.  It clari-
fied that under Halprin, “§ 3604(b) is not broad enough to provide a blan-
ket ‘privilege’ to be free from all discrimination from any source,” such as 
isolated discriminatory acts by property owners.319  It explained that the 
dispute in Halprin was unrelated to the terms, conditions, or privileges as-
sociated with the plaintiffs’ initial purchase.320  Consequently, the court 
held that victims of post-acquisition discrimination, which does not amount 
to constructive eviction, may still state a cognizable claim under § 3604(b) 
if the discrimination relates to the original terms and conditions that ac-
companied their purchase and thereby actually constitutes pre-acquisition 
discrimination.321  In other words, if victims of post-acquisition discrimina-
tion can recharacterize the discrimination they suffered after moving into 
their dwellings as pre-acquisition discrimination by relating it back to the 
original terms and conditions of their purchase, the Seventh Circuit will al-
low their claim to proceed under § 3604(b).  The Seventh Circuit’s decision 
 
dlord has discriminated against the tenants in the ‘terms, conditions and privileges of rental’ 
on the grounds of ‘race.’”)). 
 313. Id. at 780. 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. at 780-81. 
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to rehear Bloch en banc and clarify Halprin after Modesto demonstrates the 
great extent to which this issue has presented itself in civil rights jurispru-
dence. 
III.  TAKING A HERCULEAN LEAP: A DWORKINIAN RESOLUTION TO 
THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
This part suggests how the Supreme Court should interpret the FHA to 
resolve the split in authority over whether § 3604(b) applies to post-
acquisition claims. 
A. The Applicability of Dworkin’s Theory 
The Supreme Court should take a Herculean leap and recognize all post-
acquisition claims as cognizable under § 3604(b) using Dworkin’s Cohe-
rence Theory.  The statute suffers from a fundamental ambiguity over what 
constitutes housing access, integration, and “privileges of sale or rental,” 
which makes its text unavailing.  The FHA’s legislative history is also in-
determinate because during the two year legislative deliberations, neither 
the House nor the Senate discussed or tinkered with the substantive provi-
sions’ language.322  Each side correctly applied meaning-based and intent-
based theories, but neither is determinative because the text and legislative 
history do not clearly elucidate whether housing access, integration, and 
“privileges of sale or rental” involve rights that continue during occupancy 
beyond merely taking possession of a dwelling.323 
Because meaning-based and intent-based theories are inadequate in re-
solving the circuit split, alternative theories are better suited for this case.  
Coherence Theory is particularly well-suited for resolving the split in au-
thority because this case presents a Dworkinian tie, which the court can re-
solve through the statute’s best political justification—housing equality.324  
 
 322. See supra notes 67-110 and accompanying text. 
 323. See supra notes 29-61, 67-110 and accompanying text.  
 324. See Cass v. Am. Props., Inc., No. 94 C 2977, 1995 WL 132166, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 
27, 1995) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006)) (“Congress established the Fair Housing Act to 
ensure that people who have historically suffered from discrimination in housing markets 
have equal access to housing opportunities.”); supra note 69 and accompanying text; see 
also United States v. Starrett City Assoc., 840 F.2d 1096, 1103 (2d Cir. 1988) (Newman, J., 
dissenting) (“Congress enacted the Fair Housing Act to prohibit racial segregation in hous-
ing.”); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1289 (7th Cir. 
1977) (citing Otero v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1134 (2d Cir. 1973)) (explaining 
that the FHA’s goal is to provide “open, integrated residential housing patterns and to pre-
vent the increase of segregation, in ghettos of racial groups, whose lack of opportunities the 
Act was designed to combat”); Evans v. First Fed. Sav. Bank of Ind., 669 F. Supp. 915, 924 
(N.D. Ind. 1987) (“[T]he FHA is designed to address the problem of increased segregation 
of minorities; the solution being sought by Congress through the FHA is to make housing 
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Under Coherence Theory, a statute is ambiguous if it yields two valid but 
competing interpretations, or a “Dworkinan tie,” over its application to a 
situation that the drafters never expressly addressed.325  For instance, in 
 
equally available to all citizens.”); United States v. Wisconsin, 395 F. Supp. 732, 734 (W.D. 
Wis. 1975) (stating that the primary justification for the FHA is “to provide fair housing 
throughout the United States”); 114 CONG. REC. 2274, 2276 (1968) (statement of Sen. Wal-
ter F. Mondale); id. at 3421 (“[F]air housing is one more step toward achieving equality in 
opportunity and education for the Negro.”); id. at 3422 (“It is impossible to gage the degra-
dation and humiliation suffered by a man . . . when he is told that despite his university de-
grees, despite his income level, despite his profession, he is just not good enough to live in a 
white neighborhood.”); Ankur Goel, Restricting Minority Occupancy to Maintain Housing 
Integration, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 561, 574 (1989) (noting that the general purpose of 
the FHA is to “achiev[e] equality by preventing subjugation”); Nicole Schmidt, Note, San 
Francisco Public Housing as an Avenue for Empowerment: The Case for Spirited Com-
pliance With Tenant Participation Requirements, 6 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L. J. 333, 
337 (2009) (citing United States v. Henshaw Bros., 401 F. Supp. 399 (E.D. Va. 1974)) (“In 
further pursuit of the goal of equality, Congress passed . . . the ‘Fair Housing Act of 1968’ . 
. . which prohibits discrimination in the housing market based on race, color, religion or na-
tional origin.  The Act was enacted to bar all racial discrimination, private as well as public, 
in sale and rental of real property.”); Michael R. Tein, Comment, The Devaluation of Non-
white Community in Remedies for Subsidized Housing Discrimination, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 
1463, 1469-70 (1992) (discussing the anti-discrimination goal of the FHA).  Senator Mon-
dale stated that the FHA sought to replace the ghettos with “truly integrated and balanced 
living patterns.” Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (citing 114 
CONG. REC. 3422); Scott N. Gilbert, Comment, You Can Move in But You Can’t Stay: To 
Protect Occupancy Rights After Halprin, the Fair Housing Act Needs to be Amended to 
Prohibit Post-Acquisition Discrimination, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 751, 766 (2009) (citing 
114 CONG. REC. 2276) (“[T]he primary sponsors of the bill spoke of two goals: ending hous-
ing discrimination and integrating America’s residential housing.”).  The impact of Martin 
Luther King’s assassination in spurring Congress to pass the FHA further demonstrates that 
equality is the best political justification of the statute. See Jean Eberhart Dubofsky, Fair 
Housing: A Legislative History and a Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L. J. 149, 160 (1969) 
(“Martin Luther King’s assassination on the evening of April 4th accomplished one thing; it 
dislodged the Civil Rights Bill of 1968 from the Rules Committee . . . with National Guard 
troops called up to meet riot conditions in Washington still in the basement of the Capitol, 
the House debated fair housing.”).  King was an icon of racial equality.  While the gunman 
who assassinated King originally believed that his bullet would sound the death knell for 
racial equality and integration, it actually ignited riots throughout the nation, which accele-
rated the FHA through Congress. Id. at 149.  Later developments such as the addition of 
subdivision (f) to § 3604, which ensures the equality of persons with disabilities, further 
suggest that equality is the best political justification for the statute. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-
711, at 18 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2179 (“The right to be free from 
housing discrimination is essential to the goal of independent living.”); Smith & Lee Assoc., 
Inc. v. City of Taylor, 102 F.3d 781, 794-95 (6th Cir. 1996); City of Edmonds v. Wash. 
State Bldg. Code Council, 18 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1994); Proviso Ass’n of Retarded Citi-
zens v. Vill. of Westchester, 914 F. Supp. 1555, 1562-63 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Jennifer Matta, 
Informed Choice: Expanding Housing Options in an Aging Society, 48 WAYNE L. REV. 
1503, 1517-18 (2003). 
 325. Dworkin describes the circumstances as follows: 
[W]hen the words in the statute unambiguously require a certain decision about 
legal rights and duties, and when that decision is sensibly related to some widely 
supported political aim—then it is uncontroversial that the legislation includes that 
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United Steelworkers v. Weber, Title VII was ambiguous in its concept of 
racial equality and whether it prohibited employers from instituting affir-
mative action programs that expressed a hiring preference for certain mi-
nority groups.326  Justice Brennan held that Congress designed Title VII to 
advance racial equality in employment, education, and other areas in order 
to end economic segregation, which limited African Americans to lower 
paying jobs.327  He therefore found that it would be incoherent to construe 
Title VII to ban programs designed to achieve this objective.328  Justice 
Rehnquist alternatively read the act to propone a colorblind conception of 
equality that prohibited any race-based distinction in employment, even 
those that sought to advance African Americans. 329  The FHA suffers from 
a fundamental ambiguity similar to that of Title VII because its text and 
legislative history do not explicitly outline the temporal limitations of hous-
ing access, integration, or the “privileges of sale or rental.”330  The statute 
is thus ambiguous over what constitutes housing access, which produces a 
Dworkinian tie over whether the FHA requires protecting minority groups’ 
ability to merely take and maintain physical possession over a dwelling to 
achieve housing equality, or instead entails ensuring discrimination-free 
housing and genuine housing integration with ongoing rights beyond acqui-
sition and constructive eviction.  As Title VII sought to promote racial 
equality, the FHA was designed to achieve housing equality but does not 
clearly define the means to achieve that end. 
The circuit split reflects the Dworkinian tie that results from the statute’s 
fundamental ambiguity.  The Ninth Circuit conceptualizes housing access 
as involving rights that continue beyond the point of acquisition because it 
recognizes integration as an ongoing process that does not end with merely 
enabling minority groups to sign a lease or purchase agreement and physi-
cally possess a dwelling.331  In contrast, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits con-
ceptualize housing access and integration as only involving minority 
groups’ ability to initially obtain housing, i.e., purchase a dwelling or sign a 
lease or purchase agreement, and physically possess a dwelling initially 
 
decision, and judges are bound to enforce it . . . . When either of these conditions 
fails—when, for example, the words used might be used to express either of two 
decisions—then an argument must be provided establishing which decision, if ei-
ther, does form part of the legislation. 
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 24, at 319 
 326. Id. at 318. 
 327. Id. at 319. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. 
 330. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2006); see also supra Parts I.A and I.B. 
 331. See Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 713 
(9th Cir. 2009). 
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free from discrimination.332  Hence, these courts draw a distinction between 
the pre- and post-acquisition phases except for constructive eviction 
claims.333  They maintain that because the statute specifically targets initial 
housing access, the FHA is only concerned with enabling minority groups 
to acquire and physically possess dwellings.334 
The dispute over post-acquisition claims thereby constitutes a hard case 
or close question of statutory law.  The Circuits subscribe to the same theo-
ries of statutory interpretation but arrive at different conclusions because 
the statute is fundamentally ambiguous.  They consider the statute’s lan-
guage, how other federal courts have interpreted it, how HUD has imple-
mented the FHA in its regulations, the statute’s original scope and purpose, 
its legislative history, and possible adverse effects of the competing inter-
pretations.335  The dissent in Bloch further provides an extensive Chevron 
analysis.336  It concludes that HUD’s regulation represents a valid interpre-
tation of the FHA because § 3604(b) is ambiguous and HUD’s statutory in-
terpretation is reasonable based on the Supreme Court’s previous construc-
tion of the statute and policy considerations.337  Each side presents the best 
possible interpretation using these traditional tools of statutory interpreta-
tion.  However, their interpretations are grounded upon conflicting founda-
tional assumptions about the nature of housing integration, access, and the 
“privileges of sale.”  The disagreement between the Circuits therefore 
emerges over an ambiguous bedrock that Coherence Theory can resolve. 
1. The Inadequacy of Meaning-Based Theories 
Meaning-based interpretive theories fail to resolve the conflict over post-
acquisition claims.  While the opposing Circuits correctly apply meaning-
based theories, the theories provide little guidance in choosing among rea-
sonable competing meanings of the statute.338  Indeed, as Justice Frankfur-
ter recognized, “[t]he difficulty in many instances where a problem of 
meaning arises is that the enactment was not directed towards the [ ] ques-
 
 332. See Bloch v. Frischholz, 533 F.3d 562, 563-64 (7th Cir. 2008), aff’d in part and 
rev’d in part en banc, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009); Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 
745 (5th Cir. 2005); Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes, 388 F.3d 327, 329 (7th Cir. 
2004). 
 333. See Bloch, 533 F.3d at 563-64; Cox, 430 F.3d at 745; Halprin, 388 F.3d at 329. 
 334. See Bloch, 533 F.3d at 563-64; Cox, 430 F.3d at 745; Halprin, 388 F.3d at 329. 
 335. See supra notes 251-334 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 336-79 and 
accompanying text. 
 336. See 533 F.3d at 571-73. 
 337. See id. at 571. 
 338. Lin, supra note 137, at 233-34. 
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tion.”339  The conflict over post-acquisition claims involves that exact sce-
nario where the statute does not explicitly address “the troubling question,” 
but instead contains a fundamental ambiguity. 
Section (b) of 42 U.S.C. § 3604 does not contain a temporal element and 
is thus ambiguous concerning the phases it covers.340  It prohibits discrimi-
nation “in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwel-
ling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith.”341  
On one hand, the phrases “privileges of sale or rental” and “provision of 
services or facilities” imply a more robust conception of housing access, 
including ongoing rights and integration that do not end when one takes 
possession but continue throughout one’s occupancy.  Courts that uphold 
post-acquisition claims amounting to less than constructive eviction under 
section (b) properly note that the provision of services and facilities predo-
minantly occurs during the occupancy phase after initial acquisition.342  On 
the other hand, the phrase “in connection with” suggests that the statute’s 
conception of access is more limited, merely enabling protected classes to 
legally take and maintain physical possession of their dwellings.  Courts 
that fail to recognize post-acquisition claims legitimately posit that “in 
connection with” refers to the “sale or rental.”343  The Seventh Circuit 
found that the statute’s language “might be stretched” to encompass con-
structive eviction, which is the only post-acquisition claim the court recog-
nized as cognizable under section (b), but contended that “the words mean 
what they seem to mean” in that section (b) only applies to the sale or ren-
tal phase.344  Recognizing constructive eviction as cognizable under the sta-
tute but excluding other forms of discrimination is consistent with a nar-
rower conception of access because the doctrine of constructive eviction 
only protects one’s legal physical possession.345  Later in Bloch, the Se-
 
 339. Frankfurter, supra note 141, at 539. 
 340. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2006). 
 341. Id. 
 342. See, e.g., Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 
713 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 343. Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 745-46 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 344. Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes, 388 F.3d 327, 330 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 345. A landlord’s intentional action or omission constructively evicts a tenant where it 
materially or permanently deprives a tenant of his or her use or quiet enjoyment of a proper-
ty by making the premises useless to serve its intended purpose, and the tenant consequently 
vacates the premises in a reasonable time. See, e.g., Auto. Supply Co. v. Scene-In-Action 
Corp., 172 N.E. 35, 37 (Ill. 1930); Sewell v. Hukill, 356 P.2d 39 (Mont. 1960); Kimball v. 
Lincoln Theatre Corp., 261 N.W. 842 (Neb. 1935); Leo v. Santagada, 256 N.Y.S.2d 511 
(City Ct. 1964); Bronx Garment Ctr., Inc. v. Acme Multi-Stitching Corp., 235 N.Y.S.2d 92 
(City Civ. Ct. 1962); Couch v. Hall, 219 Tenn. 616 (1967); North Ridge Apartments v. Ruf-
fin, 257 Va. 481 (1999); Erickson v. Elliott, 31 P.2d 506 (Wash. 1934). By abandoning the 
premises, the tenant effectively ends his or her physical possession of the property.  It ap-
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venth Circuit focused on the word “unavailable” in holding that victims 
may raise claims of constructive eviction under § 3604(b).346  However, the 
court allowed the Jewish plaintiffs to sue for post-acquisition discrimina-
tion by relating it back to an agreement “in connection with” the initial 
sale.347  Although its relation of the Blochs’ discrimination back to the ini-
tial sale is problematic,348 the court’s focus on the concept of “unavailable” 
is a valid meaning-based interpretation of the statute.349  The court thereby 
embraced a more limited conception of housing access that only protects 
one’s right to take possession of a dwelling, which coexists with the broad-
er conception endorsed by opposing courts that protects one’s right to oc-
cupy a dwelling free from discrimination. 
Therefore, the statute’s wording is ambiguous because it may either cov-
er only discrimination connected with physical possession, i.e., the initial 
rental or sale of a dwelling and constructive eviction; or discrimination in-
volved in the continuous provision of services or facilities both before and 
after the initial rental or sale.  The statute’s “meaning” concerning different 
phases of residency is unclear and yields two equally reasonable but com-
peting interpretations. 
2. The Inadequacy of Intent-Based Theories 
Intent-based theories are also inadequate in resolving the circuit split.  
These theories call upon courts to divine the drafters’ intention and use a 
statute’s legislative history to resolve a dispute over statutory law.350  How-
ever, the legislative history of § 3604(b) is almost non-existent because 
Congress never substantially edited or discussed the provision.351  Also, 
Congress never discussed the temporal limitations of the statute or discrim-
ination in general.352  Additionally, similar to how Congress never explicit-
ly endorsed one of two competing conceptions of racial equality in Weber, 
Congress never espoused one particular conception of housing access.353  
The Circuits correctly apply intent-based theories using the only existent 
 
plies to egregious activities that make a dwelling uninhabitable, but does not cover basic 
discrimination.  Therefore, constructive eviction relates to the narrower conception of hous-
ing access that only protects against discrimination that inhibits an individual’s taking and 
maintaining physical possession. 
 346. Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 777 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
 347. Id. at 779-80. 
 348. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 349. See supra Part I.B.1.  
 350. See supra notes 152-68 and accompanying text. 
 351. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 352. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 353. See supra Part I.A.2; see also MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 24. 
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legislative history available but characterize it differently according to their 
opposing conceptions of housing access, integration, and the “privileges of 
sale or rental . . . or . . . provision of services or facilities.”354  Both sides 
rely on and recast the first section of the Act’s policy statement, Congress’ 
overall stated intentions, and comments from Senator Mondale to advance 
their opposing conceptions.355  The legitimacy of both characterizations 
demonstrates the inadequacy of intent-based theories in resolving the Cir-
cuit split. 
Courts supporting the application of § 3604(b) to post-acquisition claims 
cite the congressional record’s documentation of Congress’ concern over 
exclusionary and discriminatory housing practices and its overarching goal 
to help minorities escape from urban ghettos.356  These courts suggest that 
limiting the FHA to pre-acquisition claims would prevent the Act from pro-
tecting dwellers against a “whole host of situations that, while perhaps not 
amounting to constructive eviction, would constitute discrimination in the 
enjoyment of residence in a dwelling or in the provision of services asso-
ciated with that dwelling.”357  For instance, in Koch, where the plaintiff-
tenants suffered post-possession harassment, the District Court of Nebraska 
relied on the first section of the Act as presented by Senator Mondale, 
which stated that “[i]t is the policy of the United States to prevent discrimi-
nation on account of race, color, religion, or national origin in the purchase, 
rental, financing, and occupancy of housing throughout the United 
States.”358  The court suggested that the original wording indicates that 
Congress sought to prevent discrimination during “occupancy” and consi-
dered post-possession problems.359  However, its reliance on this provision 
is problematic because (1) the policy statement is not directly related to § 
3604(b), albeit provides more of an overarching policy for the statute; and 
(2) Congress later altered the policy statement and omitted the word “occu-
pancy.”360  The court more appropriately cites another section of the 
 
 354. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2006). Compare Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. 
City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 712 (9th Cir. 2009), and United States v. Koch, 352 F. 
Supp. 2d 970, 976-77 (D. Neb. 2004), with Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes, 388 
F.3d 327, 330 (7th Cir. 2004), and Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 355. See Cox, 430 F.3d at 746. 
 356. See Modesto, 583 F.3d at 713-14; Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 977; Richards v. Bono, 
No. 5:04CV484-OC-10GRJ, 2005 WL 1065141, at *4 (M.D. Fla. May 2, 2005); Landesman 
v. Keys Condo. Owners Ass’n, No. C 04-2685 PJH, 2004 WL 2370638, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 
Oct. 19, 2004). 
 357. Modesto, 583 F.3d at 714. 
 358. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 977 (citing 114 CONG. REC. 2270 (1968)). 
 359. Id. 
 360. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006). 
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FHA,361 which prohibits discrimination in real-estate transactions, includ-
ing “making . . . loans [and] . . . improving, repairing, or maintaining a 
dwelling . . . [,]” to further evince that Congress considered post-
acquisition situations.362  These activities are indeed typically ongoing 
beyond one’s initial acquisition of a property.  However, nothing in that 
section explicitly establishes a temporal boundary.363  Loans, home im-
provements, and maintenance may conceivably only relate to the inhabi-
tant’s taking and maintaining physical possession.364  The court also ac-
knowledged that Senator Mondale stated that § 3601 should be read in light 
of “the entire bill, the objective being to eliminate discrimination in the sale 
or rental of housing,” but suggested that this did not limit the statute to pre-
acquisition claims when read in context.365  Indeed, Senator Mondale made 
this statement while responding to his colleague’s objection to the words 
“to provide for fair housing throughout the United States,” which his col-
league feared would lead courts to interpret § 3601 to require the federal 
government to provide housing.366  The court correctly concluded that this 
context suggests that Senator Mondale’s comment did not limit the statute 
to pre-acquisition discrimination.367  Although Congressional Records indi-
cate that Congress was deeply concerned about housing practices that out-
right excluded individuals from living in areas solely on the basis of a pro-
tected characteristic, the court correctly suggested that Congress’ overall 
motivation “to eliminate discriminatory business practices that confined 
African-Americans to harsh inner-city living conditions” does not exclude 
its possibly intending to prohibit post-acquisition discrimination.368  It fur-
ther appropriately relied upon Congress’ overall “commit[ment] to the 
principle of living together,” integrating neighborhoods to eradicate ghettos 
that adversely impacted minorities’ education and employment, and inten-
tion to pass “measures that have teeth and meaning, in the eyes of every 
American, black or white,”369 which strongly evidence the statute’s broader 
objective and conception of access as embracing genuine integration. 
 
 361. 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (2006). 
 362. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 977. 
 363. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2006). 
 364. For instance, without adequate loans, one may not be able to finance his or her pur-
chase of a dwelling.  Likewise, without home improvements or maintenance, one may need 
to stop physically possessing the dwelling and vacate it. 
 365. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 977 n.6. 
 366. Id. (citing 114 CONG. REC. 4975 (1968)). 
 367. Id. 
 368. Id. 
 369. Id. 
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In contrast, in Cox,370 the Fifth Circuit recast the relevance of the policy 
statement in the current version of § 3601.  The current policy statement 
omits the word “occupancy,” which could indeed indicate that Congress 
designed the FHA to only prohibit discriminatory actions that inhibit one’s 
initial access to and physical possession of a property.  The court also re-
lied on the following statement from Senator Mondale: 
Obviously, [§ 3601] is to be read in context with the entire bill, the objec-
tive being to eliminate discrimination in the sale or rental of housing . . . . 
Without doubt, it means to provide for what is provided in the bill.  It 
means the elimination of discrimination in the sale or rental of housing. 
That is all it could possibly mean.371 
From Mondale’s statement, the court inferred that § 3604(b) only covers 
discrimination that hinders ownership and is thus limited to pre-acquisition 
claims.372  Taken in isolation, this statement could indicate that the objec-
tive of the entire bill, including § 3604(b), is to only protect against dis-
crimination in the “sale or rental” process.  However, the statement’s con-
text suggests a competing interpretation as explained above.  Furthermore, 
in Halprin, the Seventh Circuit relied on Congress’ silence and lack of de-
bate over the particular issue to suggest that the drafters never contem-
plated the possibility that discrimination might arise when “[minorities] 
were allowed to own or rent homes . . . [in] desirable residential areas.”373  
This view is also plausible because minorities were excluded from desira-
ble residential areas throughout the first half of the twentieth century.  
Congress may not have been able to foresee the result of allowing minority 
groups to enter previously exclusive areas or that discrimination would 
continue even if minority groups could take possession of property.  At this 
time, housing equality, like racial equality, was a social experiment.  No 
government institution could guarantee the effectiveness of any method de-
signed to achieve equality.  The statutes merely represented a means to ac-
complish the goal.  Congress may have indeed genuinely believed that 
breaking the rigid barriers of acquisition would suffice in ending housing 
discrimination, and therefore designed the FHA to only prohibit activities 
that would inhibit taking or maintaining physical possession.  This legiti-
mate interpretation of the scant legislative history led the Fifth and Seventh 
Circuits to draw a distinction between post-acquisition and pre-acquisition 
discrimination and hold that the § 3604(b) only applies to the latter. 
 
 370. 430 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 371. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 977 n.6 (quoting 114 CONG. REC. 4975 (1968)). 
 372. See id. 
 373. Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes, 388 F.3d 327, 329 (7th Cir. 2004). 
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The FHA’s legislative history therefore fails to conclusively indicate 
whether § 3604(b) applies to post-acquisition discrimination.  The disa-
greement between the courts over the legislative history is essentially due 
to its scant nature.374  Both sides piece together isolated sections of the leg-
islative history to support their a priori conflicting but equally legitimate 
conceptions of housing access.  Because the courts rely on and refashion 
the same history to support their positions, intent-based theories of statuto-
ry interpretation are insufficient in resolving the circuit split. 
3. The Inadequacy of HUD Regulations and Chevron Analysis 
Because there are multiple reasonable ways to apply § 3604(b) to post-
acquisition claims, two of which yield opposite results, courts have turned 
to HUD regulations to elucidate the section’s meaning.375  However, this 
approach is also inadequate because HUD regulations merely repeat the 
statute’s language and thus suffer from the same fundamental ambiguity.376  
24 C.F.R. § 100.65 identifies “failing or delaying maintenance or repairs of 
sale or rental dwellings” and “limiting the use or privileges, services, or fa-
cilities associated with a dwelling” because of discrimination as “prohibited 
actions” under § 3604(b)’s ban on discrimination in the “terms, conditions 
or privileges relating to the sale or rental” or “services or facilities in con-
nection with the sale or rental of a dwelling.”377  Courts recognizing post-
acquisition claims reason that these prohibited activities most often arise 
during the post-acquisition phase.378  They maintain that the regulation 
evinces section (b)’s applicability to current dwellers and find that the regu-
lation is a reasonable interpretation of the statute.379  In contrast, courts that 
refuse to recognize post-acquisition claims emphasize that the regulation 
merely repeats the language used in § 3604(b).380  They conclude that it 
prohibits conduct only as it “relat[es] to” or is “in connection with” the 
“sale or rental of a dwelling.”381  Indeed, because the regulation repeats the 
 
 374. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text. 
 375. Compare Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 
690, 713 (9th Cir. 2009) (reviewing 24 C.F.R. § 100.65), and Richards v. Bono, No. 
5:04CV484-OC-10GRJ, 2005 WL 1065141, at *3-4 (M.D. Fla. May 2, 2005), with Cox, 430 
F.3d at 745. 
 376. Compare Modesto, 583 F.3d at 713 (reviewing 24 C.F.R. § 100.65), and Richards, 
2005 WL 1065141, at *3-4, with Cox, 430 F.3d at 745. 
 377. 24 C.F.R. § 100.65 (2010). 
 378. See Modesto, 583 F.3d at 713; Richards, 2005 WL 1065141, at *3-4. 
 379. See Modesto, 583 F.3d at 713; Richards, 2005 WL 1065141, at *3-4. 
 380. See Cox, 430 F.3d at 745. 
 381. See id. 
PENNISI_CHRISTENSEN 10/13/2010  6:54 PM 
2010] FHA SECTION 3604(b) AFTER MODESTO 1135 
language of § 3604(b), it does not elucidate the statute’s meaning, but suf-
fers from the same fundamental ambiguity.382 
Both courts’ arguments are circular.  In relying on the regulations, they 
essentially contend: “Section 3604(b) states X ambiguously.  Section (b) 
really means Y because the regulation implementing it indicates Y.  The 
implementing regulation also states X ambiguously but really means Y be-
cause section (b) states X.”  This argument is tautological because section 
(b) is ambiguous in its statement of X.  In other words, the courts are inter-
preting the ambiguous statute through an ambiguous regulation.  They re-
solve the regulation’s ambiguity through the statute.  However, the statute 
suffers from the same ambiguity as the regulation.  Because it uses the 
same language as the statute, the regulation sheds no explicit or additional 
light on the meaning of § 3604(b)’s reference to the “privileges of sale or 
rental . . . and services or facilities.”  Because HUD’s regulation suffers 
from the same ambiguity as the statute, the regulation fails to indicate 
whether the statute applies to post-acquisition claims. 
Because both sides’ interpretations are consistent with the ambiguous 
text and legislative intent, their interpretations would be equally reasonable 
under a Chevron analysis and entitled to deference.  Under Chevron, to as-
sess an agency’s construction of the statute that it implements and adminis-
ters, a reviewing court undertakes a two-part analysis.383  The court must 
first determine “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise ques-
tion at issue.”384  To ascertain Congress’ intention, 
[c]ourt[s] employ[] the traditional tools of statutory construction. The first 
and foremost tool to be used is the statute’s text, giving its plain meaning  
. . . . [I]f the text answers the question, that is the end of the matter.  
Beyond the statute’s text, the tools of statutory construction include the 
statute’s structure, canons of statutory construction, and legislative histo-
ry.385 
“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the 
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously ex-
pressed intent of Congress.”386  If Congress has not addressed the question 
at issue and the statute is “silent or ambiguous,” the court must determine 
“whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the 
 
 382. Compare 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(a), with 42 U.S.C. §3604(b) (2006). 
 383. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). 
 384. Id. 
 385. Windmill Int’l PTE v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1305-06 (Ct. Int’l Trade 
2002). 
 386. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
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statute.”387  Here, all courts agree that § 3604(b) is ambiguous.  Whenever 
Congress has “explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill,” the agency’s reg-
ulation is “given controlling weight unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or 
manifestly contrary to the statute.”388  “To survive judicial scrutiny, the 
agency’s construction need not be the only reasonable interpretation or 
even the most reasonable interpretation.”389  If Chevron deference applies, 
then the court cannot substitute “its own construction of a statutory provi-
sion for a reasonable interpretation made by [an executive agency].”390  
The Chevron analysis here becomes problematic because by utilizing the 
statute’s unclear phrases, the regulation itself is ambiguous and susceptible 
to multiple interpretations.  Therefore, it is difficult for the courts to defini-
tively determine whether the regulation reflects a single reasonable inter-
pretation.  Consequently, the regulation provides courts with little guidance 
over how to interpret the statute. 
4. Coherence Theory as a Viable Solution to the Dworkinian Tie 
Because post-acquisition claims involve a close question of statutory law 
with a fundamental ambiguity that produces two equally reasonable but 
competing interpretations which the text and legislative history cannot re-
solve, Dworkin’s Coherence Theory is better suited to solve the interpreta-
tive conflict. 
The conflict over whether § 3604(b) applies to post-acquisition claims 
represents a hard case in which “there are two justifications [of a statute] 
available that point in opposite directions, both justifications will fit well 
enough both the text of the statute and the political climate of the day.”391  
In this dispute, the statute suffers from a fundamental ambiguity over what 
constitutes housing “access,” which produces a Dworkinian tie between 
conceptualizing “access” as achieving genuine ongoing integration in hous-
ing versus enabling protected classes to merely physically possess dwel-
lings. 
On one hand, Congress enacted the FHA to promote integration in hous-
ing as well as in other areas, such as employment and education, where dis-
crimination continued to stymie minorities’ advancement.392  This concep-
tion of access as integration recognizes housing as a fundamental social 
 
 387. Id. 
 388. Id. at 843-44. 
 389. Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 36 F.3d 1565, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing Zenith 
Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 450 (1978)). 
 390. IPSCO, Inc. v. United States, 965 F.2d 1056, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 391. See MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 24, at 425-29. 
 392. See supra Part I.A.3. 
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experience that lays the foundation for equality in other social contexts.393  
It promotes discrimination-free housing and prohibits actions that both dis-
criminate against particular inhabitants and diminish the general availabili-
ty of discrimination-free housing, even if they do not constructively evict 
or change the inhabitant’s legal status with respect to the dwelling.  For ex-
ample, this conception of access protects individuals’ ability to live in an 
apartment without their landlord writing racial epithets on their door such 
as “Nigger” or “Hymie.”  Indeed, ongoing integration involves living in a 
dwelling and receiving services free from all discrimination, not just that 
which constructively evicts.  Courts that uphold post-acquisition claims 
therefore recognize this broader justification and conceptualize housing 
access as an ongoing process that entails genuine integration extending 
beyond the moment of signing a lease or purchase agreement to facilitate 
genuine integration.394 
Alternatively, access can be conceptualized as an individual’s basic abil-
ity to take and maintain physical possession of a dwelling by signing a 
lease or acquiring title and not being constructively evicted.  This concep-
tion of access only prohibits conduct that impedes individuals from physi-
cally possessing or assuming title to a dwelling.  For example, this concep-
tion would protect minorities’ ability to live in a condominium without the 
condominium board changing their locks or setting fire to their apartment 
because the board dislikes their skin color.  It would also protect minority 
groups’ ability to obtain an apartment without a condominium board deny-
ing their application solely because they dislike their religion.  Indeed, 
when Congress passed the FHA, it sought to end discrimination by enabl-
ing protected classes to acquire and physically possess dwellings.395  
Courts limiting § 3604(b) to pre-acquisition claims emphasize this narrow-
er goal and thus conceptualize access as ending when the dweller signs the 
lease or purchase agreement and takes possession of the property.396 
Like Weber,397 the text and legislative history are indeterminate and ten-
ably support both sides.398  Congress did not expressly outline the temporal 
elements of access or “privileges of sale,” so it did not prohibit post-
acquisition claims or explicitly allow them.399  Because this dispute has 
 
 393. See supra Part I.A.3. 
 394. See Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 711-
13 (9th Cir. 2009) (reviewing 24 C.F.R. § 100.65); Richards v. Bono, No. 5:04CV484-OC-
10GRJ, 2005 WL 1065141, at *3-4 (M.D. Fla. May 2, 2005). 
 395. See supra Part I.A. 
 396. See Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 745 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 397. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201-02 (1979). 
 398. See supra Part III.A. 
 399. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2006). 
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“two justifications available that point in opposite directions,” the circuit 
split over the application of § 3604(b) to post-acquisition discrimination 
claims constitutes a “hard case” with a Dworkinian tie suited for Coherence 
Theory analysis.400 
B. Applying Dworkin’s Theory to the Circuit Split 
The Supreme Court should interpret the FHA to resolve the split using 
Dworkin’s Coherence Theory as it did in Weber.401  Under Dworkin’s 
theory, the Court should interpret the ambiguous statute to advance the pol-
icies or principles that furnish the “best political justification” for it.402  A 
proposed justification must be consistent with the statute’s institutional in-
tention and supported by the political climate of the time.403  The court 
should choose the justification that “provides the direction for coherent de-
velopment of the statute.”404  A justification provides for a statute’s cohe-
rent development if it “provides a more accurate[,] [] more sensitive or 
sounder analysis of the underlying moral principles.”405  Using this ap-
proach, the critical inquiry is: “which of the two competing justifications is 
superior as a matter of political morality?”406  In A Matter of Principle, 
Dworkin deconstructs Justice Brennan’s argument for upholding affirma-
tive action programs under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in Weber.407  
Coherence Theory would support post-acquisition claims by deconstructing 
the Ninth Circuit’s rationale in the same way as follows. 
The circuit split over the viability of post-acquisition claims under § 
3604(b) involves two competing justifications of the statute that constitute 
a Dworkinian tie – achieving genuine integration in housing versus enabl-
ing protected classes to merely physically possess dwellings.  Housing 
equality, i.e., eliminating discrimination in housing to advance minorities’ 
socioeconomic and psychological well-being, is an uncontroversial politi-
cal policy behind the FHA, which both houses of Congress endorsed and 
no one contested.408  Congress continuously re-asserted that policy over the 
two year period during which it debated the FHA.409  Allowing members of 
 
 400. See MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 24, at 325-29. 
 401. 443 U.S. at 201-02. 
 402. See MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 24, at 327-29. 
 403. Id. 
 404. Id. at 329. 
 405. Id. 
 406. Id. 
 407. See id. at 326-31. 
 408. See Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489, 496-97 (S.D. Ohio 
1976); Dubofsky, supra note 85, at 153-55. 
 409. See supra notes 75-88 and accompanying text. 
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protected classes to raise claims alleging discrimination that occurred dur-
ing their occupancy would advance the policy of genuinely integrating 
housing.  Alternatively, denying dwellers the ability to raise post-
acquisition claims under § 3604(b) and allowing landlords to discriminate 
against or harass minority dwellers with impunity under the FHA would 
severely thwart the statute’s purpose of providing equal housing access and 
facilitating racial integration. 
The FHA is also supported by a narrower policy to primarily focus the 
statute on facilitating minorities’ ability to initially take and maintain pos-
session of dwellings and prevent the FHA from becoming a general civil 
rights legislation.410  This policy partially conflicts with the broader policy 
of integration because it may conceptualize the goal of housing equality to 
merely involve minority groups’ ability to obtain housing, i.e. sign a lease 
or purchase agreement and take possession, which suggests that the statue 
should only target discriminatory events that occur in the pre-acquisition 
phase or that amount to constructive eviction.  A rule allowing post-
acquisition claims may seem to violate that policy by extending the sta-
tute’s applicability beyond the scope of initial access and physical posses-
sion.  However, a rule forbidding post-acquisition claims and maintaining 
the distinction between pre- and post-acquisition discrimination under § 
3604(b) would actually violate the both principles. 
1. The Incoherency of Categorizing Discrimination as Pre- and Post-
Acquisition and the Shortcomings of Bloch v. Frischold 
To facilitate the most coherent development of the FHA, the Supreme 
Court should eliminate the distinction between pre-acquisition and post-
acquisition discrimination and allow individuals to raise claims under § 
3604(b) concerning discrimination that occurs during any time in the ac-
quisition process.  As a matter of principle, courts should not impose an ar-
bitrary limit on a statute’s applicability.411  Courts’ decisions over whether 
 
 410. See Jersey Heights Neighborhood Ass’n v. Glendening, 174 F.3d 180, 193 (4th Cir. 
1999) (citing Cliften Terrace Assocs., Ltd. v. United Techs. Corp., 929 F.2d 714, 720 (D.C. 
Cir. 1991)) (stating that the FHA is not a “civil rights statute of general applicability” but 
instead “deal[s] with the specific problem of fair housing opportunities”); see also, e.g., Cox 
v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 745-46 (5th Cir. 2005); Brian Patrick Larkin, The Forty-
Year “First Step”: The Fair Housing Act as an Incomplete Tool for Suburban Integration, 
107 COLUM. L. REV. 1617, 1617 (2007) (“The Fair Housing Act serves as the primary feder-
al statute prohibiting housing discrimination.”). 
 411. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (warning against judicial “arbi-
trary discretion”); see also, e.g., Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 352 (2007); 
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 101 (1986) (O’Conner, J., concurring); United States v. 
Kinder, 64 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1995) (Leval, J., dissenting); United States v. Burns, 15 
F.3d 211, 215 (1st Cir. 1994). 
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the discrimination in dispute relates to the pre- or post-acquisition phase 
would be unavoidably arbitrary and underinclusive.  The distinction be-
tween pre-acquisition discrimination and post-acquisition discrimination is 
arbitrary and would lead to an incoherent development of the statute.  The 
FHA does not mention time, but instead merely prohibits discriminatory 
conduct in the “privileges of rental or sale.”412  The Seventh Circuit’s 
painstaking attempt to refashion the Blochs’ complaint about discrimina-
tion that occurred after the family took possession of its dwelling into a 
claim for pre-acquisition discrimination demonstrates the arbitrariness of 
the distinction.413 
Courts would not be able to define the temporal contours of housing 
availability and consistently draw a definitive line between discrimination 
related to the pre- or post-acquisition phase because no objective procedure 
exists to temporally classify such discrimination.  In Bloch, for example, 
the court struggled to define the temporal limitations of housing “availabili-
ty” and constructive eviction, which is the only post-acquisition claim that 
the Seventh Circuit recognizes as cognizable under § 3604(b).414  The court 
declined to define the exact amount of time in which a tenant must vacate 
the premises to establish a prima facie claim of “unavailability.”415  The 
court found that “to establish a claim for constructive eviction, a tenant 
need not move out the minute the landlord’s conduct begins to render the 
dwelling uninhabitable . . . . [T]enants have a reasonable time to vacate the 
premises.”416  However, the court never temporally defined the term “rea-
sonable time.”417  It instead sidestepped the issue by focusing on the 
Blochs’ overall failure to surrender the premises.418  The court’s reluctance 
to define the parameters of reasonable time likely evidences the difficulty 
any court will have when attempting to clearly decipher the crucial point at 
which pre-acquisition ends and post-acquisition begins. 
In addition, the distinction between pre- and post-acquisition discrimina-
tion would enable courts to concoct elaborate theories to arbitrarily deter-
mine the outcome of cases by re-characterizing the discrimination in dis-
pute.  For instance, in Bloch, the homeowners’ association enacted the 
discriminatory rule years after the Bloch family took possession of its 
dwelling,419 which the Seventh Circuit in Halprin defined as the post-
 
 412. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006). 
 413. See Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 780 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
 414. Id. at 778. 
 415. Id. at 777-80. 
 416. Id. at 778 (citing Auto. Supply Co. v. Scene-in-Action Corp., 172 N.E. 35 (1930)). 
 417. Id. 
 418. See id. 
 419. See id. at 773. 
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acquisition phase.420  Lynn Bloch even voted in favor of the rule before 
realizing that the association could use it to discriminate against her.421  
Overall, the court’s theory422 relating the rule back to the initial Declaration 
that the Blochs signed before acquiring their dwelling seems contrived.  
Courts may thereby use the distinction to devise theories that pre-determine 
the outcome of cases in an unjust manner. 
Finally, the court’s theory is underinclusive.  A rule is underinclusive 
with regard to a public interest if the rule prohibits some conduct but fails 
to ban other similar conduct that it was designed to protect the public 
from.423  As a matter of principle, courts should avoid overly underinclu-
sive rules.424  If the Blochs suffered from the same discrimination but had 
not signed such an agreement at the outset, or if the agreement was worded 
differently, the Seventh Circuit might not have been able to grant the 
Blochs relief.  Such rule would deprive individuals of the right to sue under 
§ 3604(b) based on the type of agreement that they signed upon purchasing 
or renting their dwellings.  It might even enable landlords or homeowners’ 
associations to coerce potential dwellers into contracting away their right to 
be free from the discriminatory activities prohibited under § 3604(b) after 
taking possession of their dwellings.  Such a theory would thereby impose 
an arbitrary requirement and prevent others suffering from similar discrim-
ination from suing under § 3604(b).  However, recognizing a temporal 
element in § 3604(b) would lead courts to resolve cases on such arbitrary 
grounds. 
Therefore, reading a temporal limit into the statute by distinguishing 
post-acquisition discrimination from pre-acquisition discrimination and al-
lowing individuals to sue for the latter but not the former under § 3604(b) 
would lead to arbitrary decisions and possibly future splits in authority.  
The fact that the Seventh Circuit remarkably transformed Blochs’ com-
plaint into a claim of pre-acquisition discrimination shows that this distinc-
tion is not a coherent way to develop the statute.  The Supreme Court 
should therefore abolish the distinction between pre-acquisition and post-
 
 420. Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes, 388 F.3d 327, 330 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 421. See Bloch, 587 F.3d at 773. 
 422. See id. at 777-78. 
 423. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 521-22 
(1993); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387 (1992). 
 424. See, e.g., Mann v. Smith, 796 F.2d 79, 81 (5th Cir. 1986) (overturning a county jail’s 
prohibition on newspapers and magazines because the rule was “too underinclusive” to be 
constitutional); see also, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 657 (2000) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (finding a rule underinclusive); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Eco-
nomic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 267-72 (1974). But see Cass R. 
Sunstein, Problems With Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 1022 (1995) (noting that all rules will 
be somewhat both over and underinclusive). 
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acquisition discrimination.  Allowing dwellers to raise claims for discrimi-
nation suffered in either phase of the acquisition process would coherently 
develop the statute. 
2. A Coherent Solution 
Under Coherence Theory, the Supreme Court should allow individuals 
to raise claims of discrimination that occur after they take possession of 
their dwellings under § 3604(b) because it is consistent with facilitating 
housing equality—which is the best justification for the FHA—and consis-
tent with both the statute’s provisions and the political climate at the time 
of enactment.  Overall, when it enacted the FHA, Congress sought to end 
the rampant discrimination that fueled riots and race-based violence and 
achieve equality in housing as it had already done in other areas.425  The 
FHA therefore represented an experimental panacea to eradicate the de fac-
to barriers that continued to impede the progress of minority groups.  Al-
though Congress may have envisioned the means to achieve the goal in dif-
ferent ways, i.e., either protecting inhabitants from discrimination in taking 
and maintaining possession of their property or enabling inhabitants to live 
on their property continuously free from discrimination, the goal of housing 
equality remained similar to Title VII’s goal of achieving racial equality. 
A rule forbidding post-acquisition claims under § 3604(b) would actual-
ly violate both the broad and narrow policies of the statute.  Minorities 
would be dissuaded from moving into dwellings notorious for post-
acquisition discrimination similar to how Southern African Americans’ fear 
of race-motivated violence in the early-twentieth century dissuaded them 
from moving into white neighborhoods and led them to form segregated 
ghettos.426  Minorities continue to self-segregate and hesitate to relocate to 
majority white areas because they still fear hostility and discrimination.427  
The Ninth Circuit alluded to the importance of adhering to the statute’s best 
underlying political justification stating, “limiting the FHA to claims 
brought at the point of acquisition would limit the Act from reaching a 
whole host of situations that, while perhaps not amounting to constructive 
eviction, would constitute discrimination in the enjoyment of residence in a 
 
 425. See supra Part I.A. 
 426. See supra Part I.A.3. 
 427. See Oliveri, supra note 31, at 30; see also Reynolds Farley et al., The Residential 
Preferences of Blacks and Whites: A Four-Metropolitan Analysis, 8 HOUSING POL’Y DE-
BATE 763 (1997); Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in 
Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1853-54 (1994); Sander, supra note 66, at 900, 
903. 
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dwelling or in the provision of services associated with that dwelling.”428  
Indeed, even if Congress conceived the FHA primarily as a means to ena-
ble minorities to take and maintain physical possession, the legislation 
would be toothless in promoting housing equality if it allowed landlords 
and homeowners to discriminate against minorities after they moved into 
their dwellings.429  Forbidding individuals from raising all post-acquisition 
claims under § 3604(b) would thereby violate the FHA’s policies of facili-
tating racial integration in the housing context and narrowing the statute’s 
scope to specifically target housing-related discrimination that inhibits ini-
tial access and physical possession.  Moreover, it would violate the sta-
tute’s best political justification of achieving housing equality.430 
Alternatively, a rule recognizing post-acquisition claims as cognizable 
under § 3604(b) would not be limitless or violate the FHA’s narrower poli-
cy of specifically targeting initial housing access and physical possession 
because it would only eliminate temporal boundaries on the statute’s appli-
cability, not its substantive limitations.  The statute discusses the availabili-
ty of housing and privileges of sale, not time.  Case law and HUD’s regula-
tions431 have already defined the types of discrimination that the 
substantive sections of the FHA prohibit.432  Allowing individuals to raise 
claims of discrimination that occurred after they obtained their dwellings 
would merely eliminate the arbitrary distinction between pre- and post-
acquisition discrimination.  Therefore, a rule allowing individuals to sue 
under § 3604(b) for discrimination they suffered after taking possession of 
their dwellings would not make § 3604(b) limitlessly applicable to all in-
stances of discrimination.  It would instead retain the parameters estab-
lished by the robust body of case law and HUD regulations that have de-
fined the FHA’s substantive application as a housing-specific statute and 
simply eradicate the arbitrary temporal distinction that endangers the sta-
tute’s coherent development. 
Furthermore, recognizing post-acquisition claims would not exceed the 
scope of the FHA as a housing-specific statute.  The Supreme Court has 
continuously recognized the need to flexibly apply civil rights-oriented sta-
 
 428. Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 714 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (providing examples of such situations falling short of constructive eviction). 
 429. See United States v. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970, 976 (D. Neb. 2004) (“In my view, it 
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dwelling than the privilege of residing therein; therefore the Fair Housing Act should be 
(and has been) read to permit the enjoyment of this privilege without discriminatory ha-
rassment.”); see also Oliveri, supra note 31, at 29. 
 430. See supra note 324 and accompanying text. 
 431. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(d)(4) (2010) (stating that refusing to provide municipal 
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 432. See supra Part I.A.1. 
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tutes in order to maintain their efficacy.  Although Congress hesitated to 
transform the FHA into a general civil rights statute and sought to limit its 
scope, the Supreme Court acknowledged that “[s]tatutory prohibitions often 
go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is 
ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of 
our legislators by which we are governed.”433  The Supreme Court itself 
indicated that courts should give the FHA’s provisions “a generous con-
struction.”434  The Ninth Circuit presented examples of absurd results that 
would occur if courts limited the FHA to pre-acquisition claims such as 
landlords sexually harassing tenants or raising the rent of only Jewish te-
nants.435  Furthermore, Senator Brooke, one of the FHA’s drafters, antic-
ipated that discrimination is a “complex” problem that requires an “adapta-
ble” approach “flexible enough to permit changes.”436  Abolishing the 
distinction between pre- and post-acquisition claims would not substantive-
ly change the type of claim that one could raise, which case law has already 
established.  Therefore, allowing post-acquisition claims to proceed under § 
3604(b) would not impede the FHA’s principle of maintaining the statute’s 
scope. 
A rule allowing victims of post-acquisition discrimination to sue under § 
3604(b) would advance the statute’s overarching goal of promoting hous-
ing integration and equality.  As discrimination against inhabitants during 
the post-acquisition phase remains pervasive, segregation persists and race 
continues to influence housing patterns.437  New York City Council Mem-
 
 433. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998). 
 434. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972). 
 435. See Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 713 
(9th Cir. 2009). 
 436. See 114 CONG. REC. S2991 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 1968) (statement of Sen. Brooke). 
 437. See ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION § 2:2 
(2006) (“[T]he degree to which segregated housing patterns have persisted in the modern 
era is discouraging . . . . Housing has proved to be ‘the last major frontier in civil rights’ and 
the area most resistant to change.” (quoting Charles M. Lamb, Equal Housing Opportunity, 
in IMPLEMENTATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS POLICY 148 (Charles S. Bullock & Charles M. Lamb 
eds., 1984))); YINGER, supra note 130; John O. Calmore, Race/ism Lost and Found: The 
Fair Housing Act at Thirty, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1067, 1071 (1998) (“Housing is the civil 
rights area that has most been plagued by slow, small advances, where the possibility for 
real change is viewed as most remote.”); I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 47 (2009) (citing U.S. Census Bureau, Racial and Ethnic Resi-
dential Segregation in the United States: 1980-2000, at 4 (2002)) (“Approximately a third of 
all blacks live in areas categorized as hyper-segregated, i.e., reflecting extreme racial isola-
tion.”); Sheryll D. Cashin, Drifting Apart: How Wealth and Race Segregation Are Reshap-
ing the American Dream, 47 VILL. L. REV. 595, 596-99 (2002) (citing John Yinger, Housing 
Discrimination Study: Incidence and Severity of Unfavorable Treatment (prepared for the 
U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, Washington, D.C. (1991))) (“Segregation is 
the natural tendency in America . . . . A black person who attempts to buy or rent a home 
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ber Gale A. Brewer, who represents a diverse community on the Upper 
West Side of New York City, confirms that housing discrimination remains 
a problem facing individuals in both New York and the United States na-
tionwide.438  Middle- and upper-class African Americans still tend to live 
 
has a 50% chance of being discriminated against . . . . Latinos attempting to access housing 
can expect to be discriminated against 43-35% [sic] of the time.”); de Leeuw, supra note 
122, at 388 (examining housing discrimination in the United States as it relates to the coun-
try’s obligations under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Ra-
cial Discrimination (CERD) and noting that “high levels of segregation persist” as “people 
of color continue to be disproportionately ‘concentrated in poor residential areas’” (internal 
citations omitted)); Ford, supra note 427, at 1844 (“[S]egregation continues to play the same 
role it always has in American race relations: to isolate, disempower, and oppress.”); Doug-
las S. Massey & Mitchell L. Eggers, The Ecology of Inequality: Minorities and the Concen-
tration of Poverty, 1970-1980, 95 AM. J. SOC. 1153, 1185-86 (1990); Douglas Massey & 
Nancy Denton, Trends in Residential Segregation of Blacks, Hispanics and Asians: 1970-
1980, 52 AM. SOC. REV. 802, 823-25 (1987); John A. Powell, Reflections on the Past, Look-
ing to the Future: The Fair Housing Act At 40, 41 IND. L. REV. 605, 605 (2008) (“[P]atterns 
of neighborhood-based residential segregation in our metropolitan areas remain persis-
tent.”); John A. Powell & Jason Reece, The Future of Fair Housing and Fair Credit: From 
Crisis to Opportunity, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 209, 225 (2009) (“Personal and institutional 
discrimination in the housing market continues.”); Lisa Marie Ross, Cyberspace: The New 
Frontier For Housing Discrimination—An Analysis of the Conflict Between the Communi-
cations Decency Act and the Fair Housing Act, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 329, 329 (2009) 
(“[D]iscrimination continues as was recently seen in advertisements stating racial prefe-
rences on websites designed to help Hurricane Katrina victims find housing.”); Rubinowitz 
& Alsheik, supra note 125, at 905 (“Housing discrimination seems to remain a largely in-
tractable fact of America social life.”); Peter H. Schuck, Judging Remedies: Judicial Ap-
proaches to Housing Segregation, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 289 (2002) (“Using the 
law to promote diversity in residential communities is probably more difficult than promot-
ing it in any other public policy domain.”); Robert G. Schwemm, Why Do Landlords Still 
Discriminate (And What Can Be Done About It)?, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 455, 460 (2007) 
(“[W]e know that housing discrimination, and particularly rental discrimination, is uniquely 
intractable.”); John Yinger, Housing Discrimination Is Still Worth Worrying About, 9 HOUS-
ING POL’Y DEBATE 894-920 (1998); Natasha M. Trifun, Residential Segregation After The 
Fair Housing Act, 36 HUM. RTS. 14, 14, 16 (2010) (“[H]ousing discrimination persists at 
unacceptable levels.”); Nat’l Fair Hous. Alliance, 2008 Fair Housing Trends Report 12 
(2008), available at http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/PublicPolicy/TrendsReport2008/ 
tabid/2725/Default.aspx (providing statistical evidence and documenting how communities 
remain segregated and discrimination continues); Haya El Nasser, Minorities Reshape Sub-
urbs, USA TODAY, July 9, 2001, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/ 
census/2001-07-09-burbs.htm; L. Rawlings et al., Race and Residence: Prospects for Stable 
Neighborhood Integration, in NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE IN URBAN AMERICA 1, 3 (2004), 
available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/310985_NCUA3.pdf (“[A]mong the neigh-
borhoods that were exclusively white in 1990, 81 percent remained so in 2000, while 15 per-
cent shifted into the predominantly white category . . . .”).  Segregation also continues to 
abound in public housing. See de Leeuw, supra note 122, at 358; see also Thompson v. 
HUD, 348 F. Supp. 2d 398, 467-69 (D. Md. 2005). 
 438. Telephone Interview with Gale A. Brewer, Member of the Council of the City of 
New York (Mar. 31 2009).  Council Member Brewer also emphasized the need to undertake 
more testing to identify instances of discrimination at the outset. Id.  An organization called 
Open Housing undertook such studies in New York, but eventually ran out of funding and 
closed. Id. 
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in majority black neighborhoods rather than in predominantly white areas 
where residents earn similar incomes.439  “In the suburbs, blacks perceive 
that they would be unwelcome, isolated, and, perhaps, at risk of physical 
violence.”440  Furthermore, discriminatory provisions of municipal services 
and land use designations also segregate neighborhoods.441  Federal protec-
tions promoting housing integration in all phases of the acquisition process 
are thus vital to breaking down these last barriers on the map of segregated 
neighborhoods and eradicating the lingering remnants of perceptions that 
stigmatize minority groups.  Refusing to apply the FHA to post-acquisition 
claims may undermine federal protections, endanger civil rights, and re-
verse the strides that the FHA has made by giving landlords carte blanche 
under the FHA to harass and intimidate tenants.442  Therefore, in accor-
dance with Coherence Theory, the Supreme Court should apply § 3604(b) 
of the FHA to post-acquisition claims, ranging from constructive eviction 
to basic discrimination, and thereby abolish the distinction between post- 
and pre-acquisition discrimination in order to advance the policies and 
principles that furnish the best political justification for the statute.443 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the great progress achieved by the FHA, post-acquisition dis-
crimination in housing remains a reality that residents face nation-wide on 
a daily basis.444  Although Congress originally sought to pass a fair housing 
bill that would facilitate minorities’ access to housing, Congress’ overarch-
ing goal of achieving housing equality with integrated neighborhoods and 
 
 439. Oliveri, supra note 31, at 30; see also MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 65, at 74-76, 
84-88; Cashin, supra note 437, at 600 (“When confronted with the option of integrating with 
whites, blacks now most favor a heavily black neighborhood – one that is three – quarters 
black.”).  Studies suggest that white residents are even willing to pay a premium to live in 
majority white areas. Calmore, supra note 437, at 1101. 
 440. See Calmore, supra note 437, at 1107. See generally Larkin, supra note 410. 
 441. Minority dominated neighborhoods are disproportionately more likely to be selected 
for undesirable uses, after which the white population often relocates and minorities with 
fewer resources are trapped. Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority 
Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383, 1388-
89 (1994); Vicki Been, What’s Fairness Got To Do With It? Environmental Justice and the 
Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001, 1018-19 (1993). 
 442. The FHA is an integral part of federal civil rights protections because plaintiffs can 
more easily state a cause of action under the FHA than the Equal Protection Clause or the 
Civil Rights Act. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 
265 (1977) (explaining that the Equal Protection Clause requires plaintiffs to prove discri-
minatory intent); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1976); Desiderio et al., ALI-
ABA Land Use Institute: Planning, Regulation, Litigation, Eminent Domain, and Compen-
sation, SL005 ALI-ABA 1947 (2005). 
 443. See supra note 324. 
 444. See supra notes 438-42. 
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eliminating housing discrimination represents the best political justification 
for the statute.  This principle should lead the Supreme Court to resolve the 
split in authority between the Circuits over the statutes’ fundamental ambi-
guity by recognizing the viability of all post-acquisition claims, even those 
that fall short of constructive eviction, under § 3604(b) and thereby elimi-
nate the distinction between pre- and post-acquisition discrimination.  This 
resolution would facilitate the most coherent development of the FHA. 
